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Siblings or distant relatives? A comparison of populist radical right parties in Europe

MASTER THESIS

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Abstract

This thesis has compared which political issues that mobilize voters for populist radical right (PRR) parties in Europe. The research question is “Can populist radical right-voting be explained by the same political issues in Western and Central and Eastern Europe?”

Recent theoretical development, by Pippa Norris and most notably Cas Mudde, claims that a pan-European approach is the most suitable way to conduct research on PRR-parties. This thesis sets out to perform an empirical test of their argument. If the pan-European approach holds true, it creates a major dispute within the literature of PRR-parties, especially with regards to the rule of inclusion in future research. It will also see, up until now, two separate party groups, populist radical parties of Western Europe and the more radical nationalist parties of Central and Eastern Europe, as one party family.

The theoretical fundament is based on previous literature for PRR-parties, identifying which political issues that traditionally have been thought of as salient. In addition I have drawn on literature on the Central and Eastern Europe to identify issues that are stressed as important for PRR-parties in the region. Through a survey of the literature, I have constructed testable hypotheses for all issues connected to the PRR-parties. The thesis is of a quantitative nature, with logistic regression analyses as my method of choice. The analyses were conducted making use of data from European Values Study.

The results showed that age and gender are significant characteristics for PRR-voters in the whole of Europe. Further on, immigration was confirmed as a salient issue for PRR-parties in Western Europe, but failed to yield a significant result in Central and Eastern Europe. Lack of confidence in the European Union is a political issue that mobilize PRR-voters all over Europe. More surprising is it that extremist attitudes towards minorities mobilize voters in both regions. The theoretical fundament argued that this would only be significant in Central and Eastern Europe due to a more radical political mainstream.

Based on a higher number of significant variables, stronger effects of the variables and an overall higher probability of the Western European model, the thesis concludes that PRR-voting in Western Europe and Central and Eastern Europe is not explained by the same political issues.

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Abbreviations

ALDE = Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe
CEE = Central and Eastern Europe
EPP-ED = European People's Party and European Democrats
EVS – European Value Study
ESS = European Social Survey
DFP = Danish Peoples's Party
FN = National Front (France)
FNb = National Front (Belgium)
FPÖ = Austrian Freedom Party
HSP = Croatian Party of Rights
ITS = Identity, Tradition, Sovereignty
KMO = Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin
LDPR = Liberal Democratic Party of Russia
LPR = League of Polish Families
MIÉP = Hungarian Justice and Life Party
MSI = Italian Social Movement
NDSV = The National Movement for Stability and Progress
OLS = Ordinary least squares
PDSR = Party of Social Democracy in Romania
PES = Party of European Socialists
PRM = Greater Romanian Party
PRR = Populist Radical Right
REP = Die Rebulikaner
Std. Coeff = Standardized Coefficients
Std. Err. = Standard Errors
SNS = Slovak National Party
TB/LNNK = Latvian Party for Homeland and Freedom
TDI = Technical Group for Non-Attached Members – Mixed Group
WE = Western Europe

1 Introduction

Ever since the breakthrough of populist radical right (PRR) parties,¹ from the mid-1970s and onwards, these parties have been given a considerable amount of attention from political scientists. Their impact on a number of western European party systems makes them an obvious target for research. The fall of the Soviet Union and communism in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE)² has presented political scientists with a new empirical focus for party politics. Twenty years later the question that arises is whether or not the region constitutes a party system with different political parties from Western Europe? Recent literature argue that the Western and the Central and Eastern European are converging in terms of both party systems and political parties, moving towards an increasing similarity or that existing differences are irrelevant for many specific research projects (Mudde 2007; Bohrer II et al. 2000; Lewis 2000).

My thesis falls under this subject, more specifically the convergence of PRR-parties from Western Europe (WE) and Central and Eastern Europe. The latest development within the literature on PRR-parties deals with this question (Mudde 2007; Norris 2005), and it is as a continuation of this discussion I position my thesis. In his award-winning book³, “Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe”, Cas Mudde argues that these parties share the same ideology and that a pan-European analysis is preferable (Mudde 2007). The explicit aim of the book is to provide such a perspective, reaching conclusions, which until otherwise proved, are valid for PRR-parties in all geographical contexts. It is from this point of departure my thesis will interact with the existing literature, building on the work by Mudde and conducting an empirical analysis to test his argument. Despite the fact that Mudde’s book has established itself as leading within the literature, I find that his argumentation for choosing a pan-European approach is not sufficiently developed and that some of the aspects dealt with in the book are problematic when put against a Central and Eastern European context, a fact also recognized in several reviews (Ellinas 2008; Hanley 2008; Hirth 2009).

¹ My preferred term, other labels will only be used when discussing relevant literature, when only party/parties is used, this refers to the populist radical right

² CEE = Former communist countries in Europe

³ Winner of the XIIIth Stein Rokkan Prize for Comparative Social research in 2008, ISSC/ECPR, Outstanding Academic Title, Choice

Some aspects must be taken into closer consideration before it is possible to conclude with a pan-European approach like Mudde. First, the Eastern European nationalism is not only xenophobic and verbally aggressive, but “it can be also ethnically intolerant, irredentist, anti-Semitic and fearful of external/foreign domination” (Anastasakis 2000:24). This comprehension is shared by among others Blokker (2005:377), Greenfeld (1995:22) and Hainsworth (2000b:10). The understanding that more extreme and ethnic forms of xenophobia and nationalism are more usual in Eastern Europe is supported by the fact that the general party system has moved towards the right, often incorporating parties that potentially would be affected by a *cordon sanitaire* in Western Europe, into mainstream politics (Hockenos 1993:303). Second, an important aspect is the usage of Western economic perspectives, as the transition to market economy in CEE has created a political landscape where the difference between left and right is much less distinct than in Western Europe. In fact, perceived right-wing parties often adopt left-wing positions on the economy (Anastasakis 2000:26; Mudde 2007:121). Third, the converging influence provided by trans-European party groups, often through co-operation in the European parliament, is by far less extensive for PRR-parties than it is for other party families (Pridham 2001:195).

Considering these examples, it seems clear that empirical research is needed to obtain valid inferences on the possibility of moving towards a pan-European approach when researching PRR-parties. On the basis of my questioning of Mudde’s pan-European approach I set forth the following research question for the thesis:

Can populist radical right-voting be explained by the same political issues in Western and Central and Eastern Europe?

The study sets out to identify and compare which political issues that mobilize PRR-voters across Europe. If PRR-parties can be compared, as Mudde claims, parties should mobilize on the same issues among voters in both Western Europe and Central and Eastern Europe. Identifying the political issues connected to these parties also has implications for classification and subsequent research, as will be elaborated on in the theoretical chapter.

The thesis will not explain variation in the vote share of the PRR-parties, but identify if the actual vote is motivated by the same political issues across Europe. The focus will therefore

be on political issues, not characteristics of the individual voter or the party itself, although these will be controlled for.

1.1 Justifying the thesis

Theoretical discussions of good research questions seem to incorporate two general criteria. The question must be of importance and it must contribute to the cumulative knowledge within the literature (George and Bennett 2004; King et al. 1994; Skocpol 2003).

By being of importance, the research question needs to be consequential for a large number of people on a political, social or economic level, or be able to predict future events (King et al. 1994). It is clear that on a political level PRR-parties have had a large effect, both in regards to the increasing emphasis of the socio-cultural dimension in party politics, but also their effect on mainstream politics through “a contagion of the right” (Bale 2003:157; Hossay and Zolberg 2002:305; Rydgren 2005b:420-421; Widfeldt 2004).

In addition to the obvious political impact, it can also be argued that the presence of PRR-parties have implications of both an economic and social nature. As shown by Mudde (2007), parties have strong opinions on the usage of national spending on “non-native” members of society. The SIREN⁴ project points to the fact that PRR-parties have not succeeded in countries without an extensive welfare state (Mileti and Plomb 2007).

As for social aspects, the increased focus on the socio-cultural dimension credited to the PRR-parties (Rydgren 2005b) has introduced a stronger emphasis on cultural differences and possible cultural conflicts between “insiders” and “outsiders” of the nation. Xenophobia is constantly identified as a key concept in the populist radical right ideology (Betz and Johnson 2004:316; Mudde 2000a:58; Rensmann 2003:112). This creates a different social atmosphere that is susceptible to cultural conflicts as seen in the Netherlands, with the murders of politician Pim Fortuyn and film director Theo van Gogh. Wouter van der Brug and colleagues (2005:559) put forward the argument that, what they call anti-immigrant parties, have a significantly larger potential based on the increased salience of the immigration issue than they have achieved in elections.

⁴ EU financed research project on the changing worklife and appeal of the radical right

Through taking active part in a scholarly discussion regarding the comparability of PRR-parties, it is also clear that the thesis can provide added information to the cumulative knowledge of PRR-parties. As I will come back to in the next chapter, the expansion made by Mudde has implications for how we look at PRR-parties in Western Europe as well. A number of researchers identify immigration as the uniting issue of the parties, and even as the parties' main area of competence (Betz 2002:206; Fennema 2005:1; Ivarsflaten 2008). However, with immigration not being politicized in Central and Eastern Europe (Minkenberg and Perrineau 2007), the approach taken by Mudde would lump them together with parties that focus on other forms of out-groups. As such, my results can also provide information on how to select and identify PRR-parties. If Mudde's approach is confirmed, it presents a clear shift in the comparative study of PRR-parties, as it brings together parties from two regions that, up until now, have been analyzed almost exclusively separately. If the pan-European line of thought does not hold true, it can bring together parties that should not be compared. It is therefore in the interest of the academic study of PRR-parties to conduct empirical research on this question. By examining Mudde's argument, the thesis is clearly theory-testing, searching for valid causal inferences on which political issues that mobilize voters for PRR-parties. His book is also of a recent date, and too my knowledge this thesis is one of the first major replies to his approach.

1.2 Where we are today – a geographical overview

The large majority of the literature on PRR-parties, including classics such as Kitschelt & McGann's "The Radical Right in Western Europe: A comparative analysis"(1995) and Hans-Georg Betz's "Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe" (1994), have focused solely on countries west of the Iron Curtain. Despite the different perspectives chosen to explain the emergence, sustainability or failure of the PRR-parties, the relative homogeneity of Western Europe have downplayed the question of whether or not a cross-country approach was appropriate.

However, with the fall of the Soviet Union and transformation to mass democracy in Central and Eastern Europe, a new arena of party politics was established (Kitschelt et al. 1999; Lewis 2000; Millard 2004). The political vacuum that appeared after the downfall of communism proved to susceptible to nationalist and extremist sentiments, as far right parties achieved success in early elections across the region (Hockenos 1993:5). The thorough transformation

of society presented far-right parties with opportunities not present in Western Europe (Minkenberg 2002:355).

Despite the large number of new parties that emerged, little attention has been given to the study of PRR parties in CEE countries (Anastasakis 2000:6; Mudde 2007:3-4). What has been written are mostly single case studies included in edited volumes, where they constitute a small minority of the study. The few major research projects concerning the CEE (Mudde 2005c; Ramet 1999) have dealt with the radical and extreme right in an exclusively CEE context, giving a descriptive narrative of the present situation in a number of post-communist countries.

Perhaps the first major book to attempt to comparatively explain the PRR-parties in a larger geographical context is “Radical Right” by Pippa Norris (2005). She analyses voters’ behaviour in the electoral market. Norris takes a wide geographical approach, including thirty-nine different nations in her analysis. She argues that the traditional area-specific approach potentially leads scholars to overlook growing convergence across old dichotomies, such as between Western and post-Communist Europe. While acknowledging the potential problems with expanding generalizations across regions, Norris put forward the argument that her comparative framework allows the researcher to examine voting patterns under a great variety of conditions, potentially expanding the scope of empirical generalizations (Norris 2005:36-7)

Despite generating valuable insights regarding PRR parties, she is unable to discover generalizations that hold true for all of her empirical data. However, this does not necessarily mean that cross-region comparisons are unsuitable when researching PRR parties. When selecting cases for inclusion Norris relies primarily on a left-right scale (Norris 2005:57). By using this method, Norris does not consider that the left-right spectre not necessarily accounts for the same issues or understanding across countries and certainly not across such diverse regions as those included in the study. This severely weakens the measurement validity of Norris’ measure. Subsequently this opens up for the inclusion of irrelevant parties or exclusion of relevant parties that potentially can damage the attempt to achieve causal inferences for a previously unprecedented geographical area.

Following in the geographical footsteps of Norris, albeit with smaller steps, Cas Mudde conducts a pan-European analysis of the populist radical right, adding Central and Eastern European parties to the analysis (Mudde 2007). With the vast majority of research being focused on Western Europe, Mudde agrees with the statement given by Onthos Anastasakis that “there is a lack of a comparative pan-European perspective (Anastasakis in Mudde, 2007:3). As mentioned his aim is to provide such a perspective, which sets up the point of departure for my thesis. By comparing which issues that mobilize PRR-voters both in Western Europe and Central and Eastern Europe; it can be identified if the parties are as similar as claimed by Mudde. Through contrasting regional analyses with a pan-European analysis I can also show how the latter creates a biased perception of which issues that mobilize voters.

1.3 Structure of the thesis

Chapter two will present the theoretical framework which forms the basis of the thesis. The chapter starts by highlighting a debate within the literature on the troublesome task of defining PRR-parties, showing some of the implications connected to definitional power. Second, I present the theoretical basis for the various issues that have been presented in the present literature on the populist radical right as important for their existence. From these issues I construct hypotheses for later testing. The chapter ends by constructing a debate on whether or not Europe is to be treated as two distinct regions, east and west, or if the similarities are prominent enough to ignore this division in the case of PRR-parties. I exemplify it through discussing nationalism and the converging effect of transnational party groups.

In the third chapter I turn to the methodological framework most suitable for my research question. I start off by introducing my method of choice, logistic regression before giving a detailed presentation of the variables. I end the chapter by discussing the data used in the analyses. In chapter four I carry out and present the analyses. I gradually build a model suitable to explain which issues that mobilize PRR-voting in Europe. Three separate analyses are conducted, first a pan-European, before conducting regional analyses for WE and CEE to identify difference. The fifth and final chapter contains the discussion of the hypotheses in the light of the regression results. I end the chapter by concluding the general research question, discuss the implications of my findings, and provide advice for future research.

2 Theoretical framework

In this chapter I am going to map out the theoretical arguments behind the issues that possibly unite populist right-wing parties across Europe. The chapter is divided into three separate sections. The first section covers the definitional debate within the literature, showing how different definitions can have big implications for the inclusion of cases and subsequently the results provided. The second section chapter presents the theoretical background for the political issues normally considered to be central for the populist radical right. On the basis of these issues I will construct the hypotheses. The third and final part of the theory chapter shows how nationalism and a lack of transnational party groups can provide arguments against a convergence of European PRR-parties.

2.1 A war of words: Definitional disputes

Unlike most other party families, the PRR- party is not recognizable by party name and even the debate on what to name the party family is far from settled (Hainsworth 2000b:8; Norris 2005:43). A number of different names have been used in the literature; among those are radical right, radical right-wing populism, new populism, extreme right-wing, fascism, nativism, anti-immigrant and several other options (Mudde 2007:12)⁵.

The picture gets even more complicated when one takes into consideration that there is also a great disunity on the defining characteristics of the parties. In his study of the ideology of the PRR-parties Cas Mudde identified 58 different characteristics taken from 26 separate definitions (Mudde 2000a:11). Paul Hainsworth (2000b:8) summarizes that “there are problems in conceptualizing and defining the extreme right”. Some scholars also argue that these parties must be understood on the basis of their own national contexts and that a cross-country generalization is undesirable (Anastasakis 2000; Schain et al. 2002).

A list compiled by Sarah de Lange reveals that the most used definitions consists of a combination of some or all of the following words: extreme, anti-immigrant, populist, radical, right with characteristics closely connected to the abovementioned terms (de Lange 2008:60). Mudde explains this multitude of variations as a result of the neglect by researchers to commit time and space to a discussion, often relying on previous work or choosing a term without a

⁵ For a complete overview, see Mudde (2007:12)

reflective discussion of its usefulness (Mudde 2007:12). Discussing several approaches on how to best define a party, Mudde lands on an ideological approach where he seeks out the core concepts of the “usual suspects”, leading to somewhat surprising results, like the inclusion of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, and the exclusion of the Norwegian Progress Party and the Swiss People’s Party.

2.1.1 Implications of different definitions

Through constructing a conceptual framework Mudde identifies the concept of *nativism* (my italics) as a minimum definition that is able to “travel” across Europe. Nativism is defined as “*an ideology, which holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group (“the nation”) and that nonnative elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the homogenous nation-state*” (Mudde 2007:19). Nativism is seen to be a more precise term than nationalism, which Mudde argues has been severely weakened by conceptual stretching and losing its accuracy (Mudde 2007:16-20; Sartori 1970)

With this as his point of departure, Mudde continues by adding two more elements to form his maximum definition. In his definition of *authoritarianism*, Mudde is in line with the dominant tradition in social psychology, using Theodor Adorno et.al interpretation of the term as being subservient and act uncritically toward authoritative figures (Adorno et.al in Mudde 2007:23). In the context of Mudde’s definition it is possible to both be authoritarian and also be democratic. The final core element is *populism*, which plays on the idea of a divided society, the people and the elites. Several writers on populism emphasize the importance of bringing politics back into the hands of the people, or the importance of the general will of the people (Canovan 2002; Mény and Surel 2002; Taggart 2000). It is not a term exclusively used for rightist parties, but has been closely connected to the PRR-parties (Zaslave 2008). The term best suited to describe the core concepts of the definition, according to Mudde, is populist radical right. He distances himself from the term “extreme right” used by among other Ignazi, Hainsworth and Carter, as the word “extreme” implies an anti-democratic attitude, a view shared by Kitschelt (2007).

While the PRR-parties are sceptical towards how democracy works today, they are not of a revolutionary kind, but instead working for an alternative form of government (Betz 1998:3; Mudde 2000a:12; Norris 2005:44). Also, the anti-system component in Ignazi’s definition (Ignazi 2007) of the extreme right is dependent on the system in question, making the

definition less stable than desired. Instead, Mudde uses the term radical, defined as opposition to some key features of liberal democracy, combining it with “the right” to illustrate the direction of radicalization. Recognizing the various areas “right” can point to, Mudde draws on Noberto Bobbio’s distinction between the left and the right based on their approach to egalitarianism. The right is therefore defined as “the belief in a natural order with inequalities” (Mudde 2007:26). As is visible from this, the definitions of *radical* and *right* function as indicators of *nativism*. Adding the concept of populism into the party label Mudde chooses to put it as a prefix, ending up with *populist radical right* as the final party label. Choosing this alternative, it better highlights the centrality of *nativism* as the core concept, while the other alternative, radical right populism, as used by Hans-Georg Betz, Jens Rydgren and others (de Lange 2008:60), would have given more attention to populism, which is below nativism in the hierarchy of core concepts (Mudde 2007:26).

Mudde’s arguments, of course, have counter-arguments. Since his book is of recent date, the number of direct reactions is limited. However, based on arguments presented in earlier research by authors using different terms it is possible to spot several disagreements. The biggest difference is spotted between Mudde and Wouter van der Brug and colleagues⁶. The latter identifies the parties through their stance on immigration, arguing that the only programmatic link all parties share is their resentment towards immigration, thus the most suitable label would be *anti-immigrant* parties (Fennema 2005:1). This line of thought puts more emphasis on the unity of immigration politics than a broader ideology. In addition to the work by van der Brug et.al, others have also either used the term or pointed to the fact that immigration is the only uniting element of the parties (Gibson 2002; Ivarsflaten 2008). This way of labelling the populist radical right is probably the one that goes most head to head with the pan-European approach taken by Mudde.

According to the anti-immigration definition, parties that do not have a clear stand against immigration and is attractive to voters on this ground should not be counted as a member of the party family. The emphasis on opposition to immigration as the key concept is somewhat different than the concept of *nativism*, as the latter term allows outsiders to come from within the nation as well, as opposed to the traditional understanding of an immigrant as someone with a different citizenship moving to a new country (Mudde 2007:65). Both approaches rely

⁶ See (Fennema 1997, 2005; Van der Brug and Fennema 2003, 2007; Van der Brug et al. 2005)

on an “us versus them”, but the distinction is the construction of “them”. It is clear that defining parties as anti-immigrant is more narrow than by the term *nativism*, as it incorporates only one out of four different constructions of “them” presented by Mudde (Mudde 2007:65).

This has further implications for the comparability of parties across Europe. If we decide to follow Mudde, *nativism* seems well able to travel from West to East. Remembering the definition of the term, it encompasses every non-native element that is seen as a threat to the homogenous nation-state. This includes both immigrants and, most typically in Eastern Europe, long-term ethnic minorities formally citizens of the state in question, but not the nation (Mudde 2007:68-71). A typical example is the large number of Hungarians living in Slovakia or the Roma population. A wider definition would naturally lead to the inclusion of more parties in research projects.

Researchers using the anti-immigrant term has been focusing exclusively on Western Europe, but it is possible to see how their definition would relate to Central and Eastern Europe. Several researchers acknowledge that immigration is not a heavily politicized issue in Central and Eastern Europe, giving a low priority to this in party propaganda (Merkl 2003:17; Minkenberg 2002:446; Minkenberg and Perrineau 2007:51; Mudde 2005b; 2007:71). This is not surprising as the case in Central and Eastern Europe to a large degree is that of emigration rather than immigration, especially with the recent enlargement of the European Union (Eurostat 2007). With the lack of focus on immigration policies, the anti-immigrant definition would likely exclude, if not all, at least a number of the Central and Eastern European parties identified by Mudde. This is recognized by van der Brug and Fennema (2006:2) who propose to name the party group *radical right* if Central and Eastern Europe is included. But they are unclear as to which implications this has for the rule of inclusion of PRR-parties. Ivarsflaten concludes on the selection of cases that “future studies would be well advised to identify all parties that sought to mobilize grievances over immigration” (Ivarsflaten 2008:17). If the parties in Western Europe are identified through their unity on immigration issues, we see a clear division between Mudde pan-European approach and the “anti-immigrant camp”. Extending the reasoning, the “anti-immigrant camp” would most likely not agree with Mudde that parties such as LDPR, SNS and MIEP⁷ can be equated with the more familiar French National Front, Danish People’s Party and Vlaams Belang.

⁷ Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, Slovak National Party and Hungarian Justice and Life Party

In this thesis I will follow the term used by Mudde, *populist radical right-parties* (Mudde 2007:26). The reason for this is twofold. First, as I position my thesis very close to Mudde I see it as natural to use the label to avoid confusion. Second, I find his arguments for this particular term to be sound. I have already argued for why I do not find the term *extreme* to be accurate. As already displayed the largest difference is between those who use the term anti-immigration and those using a combination of *radical*, *populism*, *right* in different orders. In my opinion the *anti-immigrant* term is too narrow as a definition. While immigration may be the only political issue that unites PRR-parties across countries, it is not excluded that other issues may be significant in specific countries (Ivarsflaten 2008). In that way I find *populist radical right* to be more inclusive than *anti-immigrant*. Regarding the order of *radical* and *populist*, I agree with Mudde that “nativism, not populism, is the ultimate core feature of the party family, radical right should be the primary term in the concept” (Mudde 2007:26).

2.1.2 Supply vs. demand-side focus

A second debate connected to the disagreement concerning definitions and terminology is the nature of the independent variables. Using a rational choice perspective, voters are often described as working in a political market, positioning themselves according to his/her own demands and the supply of parties (Van der Brug and Fennema 2007:476). Koopmans et.al (2005) refer to theories that “focus on the political opportunity structure as supply-side theories and to theories that focus on grievance as demand-side theories” (Koopmans 2005:146). While demand-side theories have been a mainstay in research on PRR-parties, it has become increasingly obvious that they alone cannot explain the variation in success (Koopmans et al. 2005; Mudde 2007; Norris 2005; Van der Brug et al. 2005). Mudde calls demand-side theories the “perfect breeding ground” (2007:201), but when the breeding ground is more or less constant, as the socio-structural background is in most of Western Europe, demand-side theories are unable to explain why the Danish People’s Party thrive in Denmark, when New Democracy was a mere flash-party in Sweden. This view is further strengthened when considering the evidence presented by van der Brug et.al (2005) on the untapped electoral potential of the populist radical right. When parties exploit their potential at such different levels it is common sense to include parties themselves into the analysis.

The call for supply-side theories to explain variation in success is justified and echoed by Mudde, who makes a strong case for turning the attention more fully to supply-side theories

(Mudde 2007:297-303). This thesis agrees that demand-side theories alone cannot explain variation in electoral success. However, the goal of this thesis is not to explain variation in success, but rather perform an empirical test of which political issues that mobilize voters for PRR-parties. This brings me back to the sociological theories, i.e. demand-side theories.

Supply-side theories put a stronger emphasis on parties and the opportunities presented by the political structure (Kitschelt and McGann 1995:14). Here, the relevance and connection between the nature and disagreement of variables to include, becomes clear. A definition is a tool to choose the correct parties. With his deep-going classification and conceptualization of parties, Mudde implicitly argues that we identified the parties that should be included in analyses and that attention now can be shifted to supply-side factors. However, the clear contrast of definitions previously elaborated illustrates the need to slow down the move from demand to supply.

Taking a step back and considering how the different definitions handle an expansion to Central and Eastern Europe, it is a possibility that a supply-side study would not include the same parties. The lack of agreement in Western Europe has implications for the expansion to other regions. An empirical test is able to shed some light on the many questions made visible by the disagreement in the literature on what characterises the populist radical right.

2.2 Political issues and hypotheses

Existing theories of party system evolution, both those inspired by the Downsean economic tradition, (Downs 1957) and by the political sociological tradition of Lipset and Rokkan (1967), agree on one point (Ivarsflaten 2008:2). Unless there is some sort of major societal change that gives rise to a new public grievance, it is unlikely that a new party will emerge. Looking at party formation through the eyes of Downs, new parties are most successfully launched immediately after a significant change in the ideological distribution among voters. Originators of new office-seeking parties feel that they can represent a number of voters who are not getting the representation necessary to have their views voiced properly in the legislative arena (Downs 1957:115/127). Lipset and Rokkan emphasize the close connection between cleavages, the expansion of suffrage and the rise of new parties. It is the cleavages in society that polarize societies enough to bring forth political parties to represent the various sides of the conflict (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). This implicitly argues that a major change in society is necessary to create a new cleavage. The following sub-chapters will present

political issues, that have had an increasing importance, and that are thought to have an effect on the populist radical right, each sub-chapter ending with a concrete hypothesis.

2.2.1 Who are the others?

At the heart of the populist radical right lies a form of identity politics based on the creation of an “us versus them” dichotomy. To construct “us” – *the in-group* – it is also necessary to construct “them” – *the out-group*. Often it is easier to distinguish who constitute the out-group than vice versa (Mudde 2007:63). In Western Europe there is a near consensus that immigration has an effect on the populist radical right (Betz 1994; Flecker 2007; Rydgren 2002; Van der Brug et al. 2005). Betz argues that for PRR-parties immigration has been the main area of political competence (Betz 2002:206). This implies that they have gained issue ownership over the increasingly salient issue of immigration (Budge and Farlie 1983; Hainsworth 2008:76). Hainsworth (2008:76) and Norris (2005:175) makes a point of the fact that it is not necessarily the sheer number of immigrants, as much as the fear of immigrants, that attracts voters to the populist radical right. While the immigration issue is important most scholars argue against the perception of the party group as single issue parties (Carter 2005; Ivarsflaten 2006a; Mudde 1999, 2000b). It is clear that the most recognized out-group for parties in Western Europe are immigrant minorities.

The challenges to a pan-European study appear with the identification of the out-group in Central and Eastern Europe. Mudde pinpoints the differences when he correctly identifies indigenous minorities as the main enemy; parties give a rather low degree of attention to immigrants (Mudde 2007:69; 2005b). As highlighted in the discussion on party labels earlier in the chapter, the expansion of an anti-immigrant label to Central and Eastern Europe would thus not include many new parties. In this section I will argue that the resistance towards immigrants in Western Europe is characterized first and foremost by a cultural form of racism, while the resistance towards indigenous minorities in Central and Eastern Europe has a more distinct ethnical/biological form of racism. I base my argument on two indicators. First, the presence of Jews and the Roma in Central and Eastern Europe gives the debate a more direct touch of ethnicity. Second, the political scene in Central and Eastern Europe is much more radical than in Western Europe, allowing for a stronger and different rhetoric that would marginalize parties if used in Western Europe. If these differences are reflected through empirical research it questions the comparability of parties.

Betz argues that the populist radical right stands for a “cultural nativism, which increasingly concerns itself with the future of European identity and particularly of the Western value system (Betz 2003:84). References to a cultural community and the importance of preserving this is also found by de Lange in her study on PRR-parties in power in Western Europe (de Lange 2008:64). The cultural form of racism is also evident in the observation by Rydgren, while parties want to limit immigration to a minimum, assimilation of already existing immigrants are reluctantly accepted (Rydgren 2005a). Fennema even goes as far as claiming that racist arguments are those that “explain social inequality by reference to biological differences that are hereditary” (Fennema 2005:8). Such a definition would actually not label cultural differentialism as cultural racism and is in my view to go too far, yet it underlines the difference between cultural and biological racism. The attention to cultural aspects is illustrated through the behavior of the Flemish Vlaams Belang, the French FN and the German Republikaner described briefly below.

Party leader of the Vlaams Belang, Filip Dewinter, precisely presents the main consequence of immigration in Western Europe. He claims that the end of the cold war marked the shift from the old left-right dimension to a socio-cultural dimension which pits identity up against multiculturalism (Betz and Johnson 2004:316). The importance of the socio-cultural dimension is an aspect emphasized by a large majority of researchers (Betz 1998; Rydgren 2005b; Norris 2005). As argued by Betz and Johnson, this reflects the growing attention given to questions concerning culture, values and identity. Dewinter uses these variables to position himself against accusations of racism, saying that “racism means a belief that on the basis of racial features a group of people is superior or inferior to another. This isn’t what we believe; everyone is equal but not the same” (Betz and Johnson 2004:316). A similar approach is officially used by the Front National, despite some implicit biological racism from time to time. The defense of French national values and identity is at the forefront of issues (Mayer 1998:16). Hainsworth notes that the FN has shied away from systematically using biological racism in their arguments. While Le Pen and the leadership often resort to an implicit version of biological racism, it is interesting to observe the effect that has in the polls. Purely biological racial outbursts tend to lead to a drop in support of the FN (Hainsworth 2000a:25).

Following the correlation between biological racism and poor performance in polls, Terri Givens observes that those parties who avoid straightforward biological racism, and instead emphasize a more cultural form of differences, have performed better at the polls (Givens

2005:201-215). My understanding is that it is a result of the acceptance level on the Western European political stage. It is plausible to assume that explicit biological racism will have a similar effect to the Willie Horton-campaign from the 1988 American presidential campaign between Dukakis and Bush. After former civil rights campaigner Jesse Jackson publicly accused the Horton-campaign of being racist, Dukakis gained ground on Bush, albeit too late to catch up (Mendelberg 2001). This is further strengthened through the theory of reputational shields for PRR-parties. Ivarsflaten argue that unless a party has a reputational shield, a legacy that can fend off accusations of racism and extremism, it is impossible to portray themselves as credible (Ivarsflaten 2006). Drawing on the Norwegian experience, the immigration debate is well describe through the book by Anniken Hagelund: “The Importance of being decent” (2003). The political norm on racism in Western Europe put restraints on the acceptable political rhetoric.

In addition to the cultural resistance against immigrants, I find it valuable to take a closer look at the relationship between immigrants and unemployment. A well-known slogan by Jean Marie Le Pen highlights the number of immigrants to the number of job-less natives, “Two million immigrants are the cause of two million French people out of work” (Golder 2003:438). The interaction effect of immigration and unemployment is significant at aggregate level in Golder’s analysis and it would be interesting to see if similar effects can be identified at individual level. Terri Givens argue that while there may not be an actual relationship between unemployment and level of immigration, voters may perceive such a relationship (Givens 2005:75) If the variable is significant it indicates that PRR-voters fear the economic consequences of immigration just as much as the cultural aspects. Unemployed voters may find it plausible to blame immigrants for their current problems regardless of how true this is.

If the attention is moved eastwards, the situation seems to be somewhat different. The problem of “the other” is either people with an unclear national identity,⁸ like the Roma and the Jews, or people with a different national identity, like the big Hungarian minorities in neighboring Romania and Slovakia. Berglund et.al agree that it is impossible to deny the impact made on the Central and Eastern societies by national sentiments and ethnic identity. With enclaves and exclaves of national minorities, the focus on these issues is further

⁸ According to the populist radical right perception of national identity

strengthened, drawing the line back to unsuccessful state and nation-building processes, for which the reasons are too many to be included in this thesis (Berglund et al. 2001:79-89).

In his introduction to “Right-Wing Extremism in the Twenty-First Society”, Peter Merkl writes that it is not easy to separate racism from nationalism, and states that the difference between the two regions of Europe is perhaps the greatest contrast among contemporary movements of the European radical right (Merkl 2003:7-15). Using the Russian case as an example, the greatest achievement of the PRR-parties is a radicalization of the political discourse (Tolz 2003:251). This increases the level of tolerance for racist political discourse, opening up for situations like the hostile treatment of the Roma in Bulgaria where anti-racism is not on the political agenda (Ivanov 2005:2-21).

The harassment of the Roma and Jews are far more widespread in Central and Eastern Europe, partly as a natural consequence of the larger number, especially of Roma, but also because it is much less condemned than it would have been in Western Europe. Nearly all countries report about persecution of the Roma (Mudde 2005c; Westin 2003:97). A popular prejudice is that they are primitive and can only be dealt with “by a whip and a small yard (Mudde 2007:87).

The Jews is another group singled out by PRR-parties in Central and Eastern Europe, being named as one of three⁹ *special enemies* by Mudde (2007:78). Anti-Semitism has long been connected with far-right movements and especially after the Second World War. The aftermath of the Holocaust practically banned anti-Semitism from public debate in Western Europe (Mudde 2007:80), but it has been present to a larger degree in the former communist countries. Therefore Central and Eastern European parties are much more open on their anti-Semitism than in Western Europe. This has, in my opinion to do with what a credible party in Western Europe can allow itself to say in public and also that anti-Semitism is not a very central feature in the ideology of PRR-parties in Western Europe (Mudde 2007:80-81). A rather shocking example of the rhetoric involving Jews comes from Romania where a publication connected to the perceived mainstream party PDSR wrote that “as is well known, the Jewish unleavened bread requires *kosher* fresh Christian blood (Shafir 1999:228). PDSR later became involved with the leading Romanian populist radical right party, PRM and

⁹ The two others being Muslims and the Roma

exemplifies both how the discourse has been radicalized and that the *cordon sanitaire* exercised in many countries in WE is not present at the same rate in CEE.

Sexual deviants, most often in form of homosexuals, are also targeted as enemies by PRR-parties (Mudde 2007). While a number of parties do not take an aggressive stance against homosexuality, Pim Fortuyn himself was gay; it is more of an issue in Catholic and Orthodox countries. It is seen as a biological and social abnormality and also “as a threat to the survival of the nation” (Mudde 2007:68). While not explicitly connected to biological racism, the concept of homophobia has a common denominator in extremism and low tolerance for people who deviate from the majority of the population.

When summing up his edited volume on racist extremism in Central and Eastern Europe Mudde observes that a racist discourse can be found in almost all mainstream parties and to some degree have been incorporated into other political issues, such as irredentism in Romania and Slovakia. Mainstream parties are also less willing to come forward and condemn racist extremism than in the West (Mudde 2005a:277-281).

Judging by the presentations above it seems to me that parties base their opposition to their respective out-groups on different foundations. The political climate in Western Europe and the emphasis on culture results in a cultural racism. However, in Central and Eastern Europe the political discourse is much more radicalized and the dividing line between PRR-parties and mainstream politics is less clear (Millard 2004:224-251). Whereas a voter from East probably would embrace cultural racism as it is a step down on the ladder of extremism, it is far from certain that it also works the other way around. The step from guarding one’s own traditional values to openly supporting biological racism is steep. If this assumption is correct the comparability between PRR-parties across regions is on dubious grounds.

On the basis of this I set forth three hypotheses:

H1a: *PRR-parties in Western Europe mobilize voters who want stricter immigration regulations based on a cultural aspect*

H1b: *PRR-parties in Western Europe mobilize voters who want stricter immigration regulations based on job insecurity*

H1c: *PRR-parties in Eastern and Central Europe mobilize voters who express extreme attitudes*

2.2.2 Political disillusionment

Europe has experienced a number of political changes in the last decades. This section will present three changes that theoretically can explain why PRR-parties attract voters. I will show how the populist elements of the parties distance them from the mainstream and make them attractive for protest votes. Second, the European Union provides a natural enemy for the populist radical right. Finally, an alternative explanation holds the parties as a reaction to increasing postmaterialism (Inglehart 1977) in the Western world. While it seems unlikely that postmaterialism has an explanatory effect in Central and Eastern Europe, due to Ingleharts limited geographical approach, it has the potential to highlight differences between the two parts of Europe.

2.2.3 The protest vote

Robert Putnam and Susan Pharr have identified that political trust and satisfaction with government is on the decline in Western Europe. Recent Eurobarometer data shows that this is also true for Central and Eastern Europe (Pharr and Putnam 2000; Eurobarometer 2007). An argument can be made that PRR-parties attract voters as a result of being a new alternative to mainstream politics, by attracting protest votes. Van der Brug et.al point to the fact that these voters are still rational as they intend to send a message to the political elites and does so through a deliberate action (Van der Brug et al. 2000). In a later review of the protest vote-literature, Van der Brug and Fennema (2006) split the traditional conception of the protest vote into two separate notions of protest voting and policy voting. A vote is a protest vote if it is cast out of discontent and lack of trust in institutions, whereas the policy vote is based on agreement with the policy considerations of the party. However, this is not a division that is used in the entire literature (Van der Brug and Fennema 2006:5-6). The variables connected to the protest vote-concept in my thesis ask about lack of confidence in institutions. That implies that it falls under the more narrow protest vote-concept of Van der Brug and Fennema. Significant results on more policy-oriented variables would imply that a vote casted for PRR-parties is policy vote.

The protest vote must be seen in the light of the populist elements of the parties. Whether it is seen as a ideological aspect (Mudde 2007) or as a political rhetoric (Betz 2002), it is a central

element for the populist radical right. Nearly all scholars on the topic have some form of a reference to populism. The definition by Mudde holds populism as a division between “the pure people” versus “the corrupt elite”, also highlighting the will of the people (2007:23). While Mudde sees populism as an ideology, his definition is in line with other scholars who see it as a political rhetoric. Both Mený and Súrel (2002) and Canovan (2002) emphasize that politics have escaped control of the people.

Almost all PRR-parties speak up for a closer relationship between the public and politics, portraying themselves as the voice of the people (Mileti and Plomb 2007:11). In fact, some of them even dislike the word party to describe themselves, preferring the term movement. They benefit from their relative clean record sheet in mainstream politics and present themselves as “distinct alternatives outside the political class”, clean-hands alternatives, which want to give the power back to the people” (Rydgren 2005a:vii). Betz argues that the emergence of populism is a response to the growing gap between what voters want and what politics can offer (Betz 2005). Eatwell finds proof of this in falling turnouts and lower share of votes going to mainstream parties, referring to the term originating in Germany, *politikverdrossenheit* (Eatwell 2003:51). Both Eatwell (2003) and Ignazi (2003, 2007) see falling legitimacy as a central reason for the endurance of the populist radical right.

This trend is also evident in Central and Eastern Europe, through both quantitative and qualitative observations (Anastasakis 2000:23; Minkenberg 2000:175; Williams 1999:32; Eurobarometer 2007). As Williams writes, expectations were high after the collapse of communism and the lack of immediate progress has opened up a source of discontent that the populist radical right has tapped into. Zaslove adds to this by pointing out that the tensions from the transition and following democratization processes has provided a fertile background for populism (Zaslove 2008:326). Mudde also finds that populism is indeed a factor in Eastern European politics, but also that parties are treated quite differently, benefiting from the fact that political populism is a natural part of the mainstream political agenda (Mudde 2000b:43-44).

Of the various aspects traditionally used to explain PRR-voting I find the protest vote most difficult to direct geographically between WE and CEE. Historically, it has been a much emphasized aspect in the Western literature, but empirical studies show that the resentment is in fact bigger in CEE. Recent Eurobarometer surveys show that the percentage of respondents

who do not trust national governments and national parliaments is higher in the new member states (Eurobarometer 2007, 2008). This is also evident in earlier statistics which is closer in time to the dataset used in this thesis (Eurobarometer 2001) (see appendix). On the basis of the empirical results I believe the significance of protest voting to have the biggest potential in CEE seen in the light of the expectations after the fall of communism, although I will not be surprised if it turns out that the variable is significant in both regions.

H2: *PRR-parties in Central and Eastern Europe mobilize voters who are disillusioned with political elites to a larger degree than in Western Europe*

2.2.4 The European Union

One of the most profound political changes in Europe over the last decades has been the intensified European integration. During the last 22 years the Union has incorporated a single market, EU citizenship, an increasingly active judicial branch, a common European currency, a directly elected parliament with expanded capabilities and last but not least, been through a massive expansion. Starting with the accession of Spain and Portugal in 1986, the number of member states has increased with 17 states¹⁰, with further accession talks in process.

Despite the fact that the EU has been a success on many areas, it is still seen by some as an elite project with a democratic deficit (Hix and Følledal 2005) and a popularly rejected constitution. This is partly why the European Union is not viewed very positively by the populist radical right (Mudde 2007:159f; Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2006). However, this has not always been the case as parties were positive to European integration in the mid-eighties. The turning point came with the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 and Hainsworth argues that European integration has become an increasingly important issue for the populist radical right in recent years (Hainsworth 2008:82; Mudde 2007:159).

What is then the resistance against integration based on? Two main arguments can be made which explain the low level of support. First, given the predominance of nationhood, nationalism and national identity, it is no surprise that parties react to what they see as a supra-national body (Mudde 2007:159). Most PRR-parties are euroskeptics, basically positive to the basics of European integration, but skeptical towards the direction EU has taken. As

¹⁰ 1986: Spain, Portugal, 1995: Austria, Sweden, Finland, 2004: Cyprus, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Czech Republic, Hungary, 2007: Bulgaria and Romania

quoted by Hans-Georg Veen: “the supranational union of nationalist parties is a contradiction in itself, but not necessarily a complete one” (Veen in Mudde 2007:182).

The second argument stems from the populist discourse of the populist radical right. Having built their image as a political parties which give “supremacy to the interests of the people” (Betz and Johnson 2004), the political distance from the people to Brussels is seen as problematic. Hainsworth note that PRR-parties tend to see European integration as a “bureaucratic and elitist phenomenon” with a top-down approach (Hainsworth 2008:82). The EU is often seen as an overarching scapegoat (Minkenberg and Perrineau 2007:32).

A number of corruption scandals have also decreased trust in politicians, creating a grievance against contemporary politicians (Ivarsflaten 2008; Kitschelt 1995; Rydgren 2005b). Despite having distinctly younger democracies, contempt for politicians is also a feature in Central and Eastern European politics because the communist regimes created a divide between “the moral non-Communist people” and “the corrupt Communist elite”. This dichotomy is easily transferable to match the Western resentment of politics with the “moral civil society” against “the corrupt state” (Mudde 2000b:45). Still, the relatively short involvement¹¹ with the EU in CEE also opens up the possibility of seeing the EU as a counterweight to incompetent national politicians, given the past troublesome decades on domestic grounds. The EU is also involved in more aspects in everyday life in WE than in CEE at the present point of time.

H3: *PRR-parties in Western Europe mobilize voters that are negative to the EU*

2.2.5 A silent counter-revolution?

Is the populist radical right a silent counter-revolution to the shift in values and political styles as described by Ronald Inglehart (1977)? The original revolution is described by Inglehart as a process where values shift from a heavy emphasis on well-being and physical security towards more attention to the quality of life (Inglehart 1977:3). Connected to the value shift, it is plausible to think, that voters at the same time change their views on political issues. The traditional issues that are identified with post-materialism are environmental issues, quality of life, role of women etc. On the other hand, Inglehart is also aware of the contrasts between

¹¹ At the time of the data collection CEE states were not yet members of the EU, but it had been a political issue for some time due to the accession talks. I will get back to this in the subchapter on the data.

“new politics” and traditional values and norms and that it has often resulted in the creation of new parties (Inglehart 1977:13).

Kitschelt and McGann is in line with Inglehart when he divides between industrial and post-industrial societies (Inglehart 1977:21). They argue that post-industrial politics is characterized by the divide between the left-libertarians and right-authoritarians (Kitschelt and McGann 1995). Where the Green parties represent the left-libertarians, PRR-parties are on the opposite side of the party spectre. This is illustrated by environmental conflicts which is listed as one out of four specially salient issues along the “new left” – “new right” spectrum (Kitschelt and McGann 1995:20).

Johan Veugelers identifies the same value change and following shift in political issues as the researchers above, but also emphasises the duality of post-materialist theory. The political spectre has not just tilted to the left, an equal reaction has happened on the far right end as well. As early as in 1981 Lipset observed that:

“while postmaterialist tendencies have generated new sources of support for left from a segment of the more affluent and better educated, reactive social conservatism has helped recruit support for right-of-center parties from less privileged and less educated strata” (Lipset 1981:521).

Ivarsflaten summarizes the argument by concluding that voters feel that environmentalism has gone too far, gasoline has become too expensive and industries are weakened due to environmental demands by politicians. Therefore PRR-parties attract voters who feel that political intervention is unnecessary to protect the environment (Ivarsflaten 2008:6).

Societies shifts toward post-materialist values when people experience what Inglehart calls “exceptional economic security” (Inglehart 1977:3). While the development in Central and Eastern Europe is heading in a positive direction it is unlikely that citizens in these countries have experienced the preconditions for post-material values to such a degree that it is sufficient to call for the reactions theoreticized in Western Europe. As a reaction to the increasing emphasis on post-materialist values I set forth my third hypothesis:

H4: *PRR-parties in Western Europe mobilise voters who feel that political financial involvement in environmental issues is unnecessary*

2.2.6. An authoritarian view on politics

On January 5th 2006 the International Herald Tribune could report that two-thirds of the Russian population preferred a strong leader instead of a democratic government (IHT 2006). A popular account of Russian politics is the country's fascination with strong leader, which is displayed through the popularity of former president Putin in contemporary Russia. The charismatic party leader of the LDPR, Vladimir Zhirinovsky has claimed that only a dictatorship can save Russia (Mudde 2007:150) and similar requests are made in Hungary (Toth and Grajczjar 2007:205). Though Zhirinovsky is among the most extreme politicians in Russia, and probably Europe as well, the question of how authoritarian attitudes fit with the populist radical right arises!

Mudde is quick to point out that in the context of the populist radical right the meaning of the word authoritarianism is not the same as within the democratization literature, but follows the dominant tradition within social psychology. Referring to Theodor Adorno and the Frankfurter school, authoritarianism is interpreted as "a general disposition to glorify, to be subservient to and remain uncritical toward authoritative figures of the ingroup and to take an attitude of punishing outgroup figures in the name of some moral authority" (Adorno et.al in Mudde 2007:22). Following that line of reason, Mudde operationalizes authoritarianism as a belief in a strictly ordered society, where challenges to this authority is intolerable (Mudde 2007:23).

The authoritarian aspect is heavily emphasized by Kitschelt, who includes it in his winning formula for the radical populist right, saying that it stands for hierarchical arrangements in politics and a limited diversity in cultural expression (Kitschelt and McGann 1995:2). An important aspect within authoritarianism is a strong state, which might seem a bit contradictory to the parties traditional *lassiz-faire* approach to politics (Hainsworth 2000b:9).

Where Western parties traditionally accept democracy as a principle, but object the direction liberal democracy is headed, flirtation with more authoritarian aspects is more accepted in Eastern Europe. Michael Minkenberg claims that the Eastern European parties are more reverse-oriented in that they are more anti-democratic. The logic behind the argument is that years under communist rule and the following transition period to democracy has created society that is more recipient of traditional authority and survival values. This contrast is well exemplified by the German case, where support for democracy as a form of government is

notably lower in the Eastern part than in the former West Germany (Fuchs 1999:131; Minkenberg 2000:188; 2002:358). The support for strong government is also supported by Miller et.al through their comparison of Central and Eastern European countries versus Britain (Miller et al. 1998:17).

In Western parts of Europe, the emphasis seems to be more on the law and order aspects of authoritarianism. A key issue is the fight against crime and tougher penalties is a recurring theme in party programs (Mudde 2007:146-147). Rydgren sees this in relation to the increased salience of the socio-cultural cleavage explaining that it is a part of the “doctrinal and rhetorical core” (Rydgren 2002:27)

Authoritarian views seem to have a central position in definitions of the populist radical right. That alone makes it interesting to test whether or not it is a uniting element, but the observations by Minkenberg makes it even more fruitful. He indicates that post-communist countries are more inclined to flirt with anti-democratic standpoints and that this is a result of the massive societal changes experienced in the last decades. If this is true, the desire for strong leadership on the expense of democratic governance should not be significant in Western Europe where the emphasis has focused more on law and order issues. With this in mind I set forth the following hypotheses:

H5a: *PRR-parties in Eastern and Central Europe mobilize voters who support strong leadership*

H5b: *PRR-parties in Western Europe mobilize voters who support stronger reactions to violations of the law*

2.2.7 Economic changes

The economy has a great influence on politics, an observation that is easily recognizable during the contemporary world-wide economic crisis. Since the groundbreaking “An economic theory of Democracy” by Anthony Downs (1957), a number of studies have been conducted that have confirmed the connection through empirical studies (Alvarez et al. 2000). According to Alvarez and colleagues, it should therefore not come as a surprise that perceptions of economic conditions by individual voters have a strong influence on the choices made by the same individual voters (Alvarez et al. 2000:238).

There is little doubt that big economic changes have taken place in Europe over the last decades. Already in 1992 did Mackie et.al note that Western countries were undergoing economic transformations that were nothing less than dramatic (Mackie et al. 1992). If we factor in the even more dramatic changes undertaken in Central and Eastern Europe with the transition from communism to market economy (Minkenberg 1994), it is clear that the economy is an issue that, probably even more than traditionally, has affected voters at the same time as the emergence of the populist radical right.

The economy has been a popular issue in the research on the populist radical right. Two of the earlier classics by Betz (1994) and Kitschelt (1995), give the economy a central place in their theories. Betz sees PRR-parties as a reaction to the social-democratic welfare state, deemed unable to face new challenges stemming from increased globalization. As their answer to economic stagnation they proposed a radical neo-liberal economic agenda (Betz 1994:171). Kitschelt included a neo-liberal economy into his “winning formula”, pointing to many of the same reasons as Betz, that parties revolt against higher taxes and ever-increasing welfare-states (Kitschelt and McGann 1995). Despite that in recent years several scholars have questioned or denied the necessity of right-wing economics (Carter 2005; Ivarsflaten 2005; Mudde 2007), it is still described as a predominant view by Mudde in his review of the economic literature of the populist radical right (Mudde 2007:120). This is not very surprising considering that they are, at least thought to be, located at the far right of the socio-economic left-right spectre. The logic here is that PRR-parties can be successful if they attract voters based on a neo-liberal message (Ivarsflaten 2008:4). These voters, on a general basis, prefer less state intervention and protectionism in the economic sphere.

What is interesting is that while, according to Kitschelt and Betz, populist radical right voters in Western prefer less state intervention, the focus seems to be somewhat different in Central and Eastern Europe. The change from communism to capitalism has led to increasing inequality among citizens (Berglund et al. 2001:30). Thus, the attention is the opposite than in the West, with a red-brown alliance mixing nationalistic rhetoric with leftist political ideas, (Miller et al. 1998; Anastasakis 2000:26). The region is also more sceptical to privatization, as a consequence of the transition to capitalism riddled with corruption and patronage (Mudde 2007:129). Radoslaw Markowski takes a very clear position against the domination of neo-liberal economics in populist radical right politics. Referring explicitly to Kitschelt, he argues that parties are fundamentally different across regions as “CEEC parties are definitively

opting for state protectionism and economically leftist ideas. Neoliberal stances are totally missing” (Markowski 2002:28).

Jan Fidrmuc detects a similar pattern in his research on the economics of voting in the former communist countries. He finds that the economy clearly played an important role in the first elections following the fall of communism. The economic reforms created winners and losers and thus also voters who either supported or opposed reforms. Fidrmuc identifies the winners as private entrepreneurs, urban residents and white-collar highly educated workers. The losers on the other hand are the unemployed, retirees, blue-collar workers and rural residents (Fidrmuc 2000:215). His description of “the losers” is very similar to the stereotype of the average PRR-voter (Mudde 2007) and goes well in hand with the comments made by the researchers mentioned above. This shows that there is a discrepancy in the view of economic preferences for PRR-parties.

A different approach, taken by those who are not convinced about the vital position of neo-liberal economics, show how parties are in favour of an extensive welfare state for those who belong to the nation in question (Mudde 2007:122). The SIREN Project also points to a “plea for a better welfare state” (Flecker et al. 2007:56). This line of reasoning is most often called “welfare chauvinism”, calling for an extensive welfare state for all those entitled to it. Those not entitled are the same enemies as elaborated in sub-chapter 2.3.1, namely immigrants and indigenous ethnic group (Mudde 2007:130f).

Considering the unclear economic landscape when concerned with PRR-voting, the hypothesis will not have a direction but merely state that economic preferences mobilize PRR-voters. The coefficient sign will reveal the direction of the variable.

H6: *Economic preferences mobilize voters for PRR parties*

2.3 A divided Europe?

The following two sub-chapters present the leading arguments from two debates that have implications for the convergence of PRR-parties, and that are not necessarily connected to political issues. The goal is to show that while some argue for an increased convergence, there is not necessarily a theoretical agreement and the probability for a still divided Europe in terms of my research question is still very much present. The first sub-chapter looks at the

nationalism debate, placing the classical dichotomy by Hans Kohn up against more recent empirical findings and explaining how this has implications for the comparability of the populist radical right. The second sub-chapter looks at the converging effect of transnational party-group, especially those present in the European Parliament.

2.3.1 Two forms of nationalism?

The centrality of nationalism to PRR-parties makes it natural to look more closely at this term. One of the seminal contributors to the study of nationalism, Hans Kohn, argues in his celebrated work “The Idea of Nationalism” that there exists a dichotomy between a civic nationalism in Western Europe and an ethnic nationalism in Eastern Europe (2005 [1944]). This was a controversial statement when published and recent contributions have questioned the validity of such a dichotomy (Hjern 2003; Kuzio 2002; Shulman 2002). André Liebich even claims that the ghost of Hans Kohn is haunting the study of nationalism (2006:579). However, other accounts by Greenfeld (1995) and Ignatieff (1993) support the tradition stated by Kohn.

The argument put forward by Kohn relies on a historical account of nationalism, which did not develop as we know it today until the 1850s (Kohn 2005 [1944]:3; Smith 1986:138). Whereas the Renaissance and Reformation changed society in Western Europe, it did not have the same impact in Germany and Eastern Europe. In the West, nations were created as unions of citizens integrating around a political idea, but the German nationalism, less affected by the aforementioned historical events, did not find the same rallying point for a future society and looked backwards into its own past and myths to find the basis of their nationalism (Kohn 2005 [1944]:331/351). The divide is closely connected to the formation of the state. In Western Europe nationalism was mainly a political occurrence preceded by state formation, following the theories on state and nation-building by Stein Rokkan (Kohn 2005 [1944]:329; Rokkan 1980). In Central and Eastern Europe, nationalism rose at a more backward stage of social and political development and the boundaries of the state and nationalism rarely coincided (Kohn 2005 [1944]:329).

The political and social changes in Europe, involving the concepts of liberty, humanity and patriotism, deepened the differences between Western and Eastern Europe. Different interpretations led to a Western nationalism based upon liberal middle class concepts pointing towards democracy and an Eastern nationalism based upon pre-enlightenment concepts

leading towards exclusiveness (Kohn 2005 [1944]:455-457). A closer examination of this point reveals the resemblance to the much later work of Jürgen Habermas on a constitutional patriotism based around the civic ideals described by Kohn (Habermas 1992). Habermas defines the nation in two variants, either a “nation of citizens” or an “ethnic nation”. The former is a product of politics and the collective will built up on choice and contracts. The latter however is pre-political and a product of history and myth (Habermas et al. 1998).

The dichotomy is further elaborated by Anthony Smith in his presentation of the territorial and the ethnic nation. Smith argues that the emergence of nations was brought forward by a triple revolution originating in Western Europe and spreading across the continent during a long time-span. The revolutions were “in the sphere of the division of labour, a revolution in the control of administration, and a revolution in cultural co-ordination (Smith 1986:131). The first revolution created the sense of a nationalism to integrate various actors into a unified national economic system. The second, as a result of increasing need of a streamlined bureaucratic to maximize resources at a minimum cost and the third, cultural co-ordination, had the state replace the ecclesiastical authority, thus gaining more control over education (Smith 1986:131-134).

Through these three revolutions, Western polities gradually emerged from ethnic to territorial nations. In the East however, the revolutions came at a much later point in time and very unevenly. The existing polities did already consist of distinct and separate ethnic communities, more often than not under the domination of a core *ethnie*, like the Ottoman, Austrian and Russian empires. This leads to a larger emphasis on ethnic criteria “crossed with memories of former statehoods in the area” (Smith 1986:141).

A territorial nation takes its basis from a sense of territory with the logic of moving from “state-to-nation”. The state as a territory is both sovereign, yet strictly bounded, along the lines of Benedict Anderson’s definition of the nation as an imagined community – “both inherently limited and sovereign”(1983:15). Other elements in territorial nationalism are legality – a community of laws and legal institutions, citizenship – absolute membership and legal equality of rights and duties, and a common culture (Smith 1986:135-136).

The ethnic nation is the reverse process of the territorial nation in the way that it goes from “nation-to-state”. Nations were gradually formed on the basis of pre-existing ethnic ties,

producing a core of genealogy, populism, customs, dialects and nativism. Inclusion here is not based on citizenship, but belonging to the ethnic group constituting the nation. In contrast to the territorial nation, these nations tend to substitute legal codes and institutions with customs and dialects, elevating historical elements to official status (Smith 1986:137-138).

Following the dichotomy developed by Kohn and elaborated by Smith, the line of reasoning is that there is a difference in which nationalism prevails in Western Europe versus the Central and Eastern Europe. This understanding is further backed up by more recent accounts from leading researchers on nationalism. Roger Brubaker writes that there is little chance of the civic notion to prevail in Eastern Europe given the “pervasively institutionalized understandings of nationality as fundamentally ethno-cultural rather than political, as sharply distinct from citizenship, and as grounding claims to ownership of polities” (Brubaker 1996:105). Brubaker’s account is also backed by the statement by George Schopflin who links nationalism with communism. Under the Soviet-era, resistance against communism became a national project and under these circumstances “it was very difficult for any civic dimension of nationhood to emerge” given “the strongly ethnic character of nationhood and state legitimation” in the region (both quotes from Schopflin 1996:153). Stefan Auer, while warning against a simplistic dichotomy of nationalism, identifies the battle between liberal nationalism and nationalism driven by xenophobia and chauvinism as vital for the survival of consolidated democracy in Central and Eastern Europe (Auer 2000:244).

In recent years several researchers have questioned the validity of Kohn’s dichotomy (Björklund 2006; Hjern 2003; Kuzio 2002; Shulman 2002). The criticism either points to the gross oversimplification of the divide or the fact that empirical research is unable to reveal any clear geographical divide between Central and Eastern Europe.

A theoretical argument is made by Taras Kuzio who argues that the framework presented by Kohn is badly flawed on six points. The most central point made by Kohn is that all states in the West share “cultural horizons, values, identities and historical myths in a common history that is the nation”(Kuzio 2002:24). Furthermore the ignorance of anti-democratic cases in the West and civic elements in the East makes the geographical distinction flawed. Kohn ignores several states from Western Europe and lumps together the nationalisms he dislikes into the Eastern category. Third and fourth, the geographical division of nationalism, which Kuzio describes as artificial, ignores ethnic and territorial violence in the West as well as the fact

that Western states were not always fully inclusive of social and ethnic groups (Kuzio 2002:25-26). The fifth point is that Kohn ignores the fact that nationalism in the East can evolve from ethnic to civic, as it did in the West. Finally, Kuzio writes that nation-building elements have been positively viewed in the West, but portrayed as negative in the East. He points for instance to how France, as a civic nation, also homogenizes their inhabitants (Kuzio 2002:28).

Using an alternative framework building on Robert Dahl's definition of a civic state¹², Kuzio argues that Western states only became civic in the 1960s and that the new states in Central and Eastern Europe has gone through this process after 1989. This contradicts the time span used by Kohn, who argues that the change from ethnic to civic occurred in the 1850s (Kohn 2005 [1944]:3). Kuzio holds that evolution from ethnic to civic has little to do with geography, but is a process initiated by international institutions and democratic consolidation. Both Western and Eastern states have used histories and myths, further weakening the logic of "either-or" (Kuzio 2002:32-36).

While Kuzio works at a theoretical level, several empirical studies have been conducted in recent years. They do not use the alternative framework presented by Kuzio, but provide results that add more questions to the continued validity of Kohn's dichotomy (Björklund 2006; Hjern 2003; Shulman 2002).

Shulman, in his study of fifteen countries, finds that the classic divide between West/civic and East/ethnic is a "gross oversimplification" (Shulman 2002:583). While some analyses support the dichotomy, an equal number do not, and overall the data suggest that Eastern Europe is not strongly culturally positioned. Cultural conceptions of nationhood is also present in long-time democratic and civic states in the West (Shulman 2002:583).

Similar findings are discovered by Hjern, who concludes that "there seems to be support for the revisionist standpoint (Hjern 2003:427). Frederika Björklunds study of Latvia, Lithuania and Poland also provides criticism towards Kohn. Despite finding clear indications of an ethnic understanding of nationalism in Latvia this is not true for the other two countries, proving that Eastern Europe is not ethnic as a unit (Björklund 2006:112-113).

¹² Free and fair elections, an inclusive suffrage and the right to run for office (Dahl 1971)

What are the implications for of the nationalism debate for PRR-parties? It is clear that nationalism is a central concept for these parties (Eatwell 2000:412), and if nationalism is distinctly different in the West from the East, then it is theoretically plausible that parties also are different. Despite the fact that recent empirical results questions the divide, PRR-parties in Eastern Europe seems to have a more extreme focus than their Western counterparts, which is evident in the treatment of minorities (Hockenos 1993; Merkl 2003:3/15; Mudde 2000a:277; Williams 1999:32). While all PRR- parties drift towards ethnic nationalism, the Central and Eastern version is much more extreme due to a more radicalized political context and are thus able to use stronger and more extreme rhetoric. Central and Eastern parties are also to a larger degree associated with mainstream politics than in Western Europe (Mudde 2005a). So while the two different forms of nationalism do not necessarily separate the nationalisms of PRR-parties, the perceived duality of mainstream nationalism in the two regions creates distinctly different political climates to operate in.

2.3.2 The converging effect of transnational party groups

A central point in the argumentation for a pan-European analysis is the convergence through the European Union, given the homogenizing effects of membership (Mudde 2007:3). With Central and Eastern European countries gaining accession in 2004, it is natural to assume that the converging effect is more a process for the new member countries to adapt the existing *acquis communautaire*, than a process where two equal parts convergence towards the centre. To serve as a reminder of the accession process, the Copenhagen Criteria highlights some of the areas where the new member states had to adapt Union policies. New members must have stable institutions that guarantee for democracy, the rule of law, human rights and for protection of minorities. In addition to these fundamental rights, several demands concerning market economy and ability to perform its duties as a member state is fundamental for the entrance into the European Union (European Council 1993).

It is interesting to observe that minority protection is mentioned in the Copenhagen Criteria as they often constitute the “enemy” according to Mudde (Mudde 2007:69). Is it plausible to assume that EU impact is the same at party level as it is at state level? Dorota Dadowska writes that “although there is a general agreement that the EU effects the polities of Central and Eastern European countries, the impact of EU enlargement on the political parties remains more uncertain to determine” (Dakowska 2007:3). Has Western parties influenced

their Eastern counterparts to such degree that they can no longer be separated? If so, is this also true for populist radical parties?

The main form of transnational party cooperation in Europe takes place through party federations and party groups in the European Parliament. Transnational party cooperation is an old concept, but in a European context it has intensified with the increased role of the directly elected European Parliament. It has been the most effective way to improve capacity in order to handle the new institutional environment present in the ever-changing union (Hix and Lord 1997:2). Despite a volatile European party system, an argument can be made that a stable core has emerged around the EPP-ED, PES and ALDE¹³ (Delsoldato 2002:272). Despite varying member parties, the core of these three groups can ideologically be labeled as Christian Democrats/Conservatives (EPP), Social democratic (PES) and liberal (ALDE).

In the decade leading up to the accession European party federations increased the attention given to the Central and Eastern Europe (Spirova 2008:795). Already in 1996 did the EPP-ED offer observer status, followed by associate status in 1998, to potential new partners from candidate countries (Dakowska 2002:280-1).

Hix and Lord argue that one of the main purposes for a political organization is to agree on common goals, pointing to an emerging network among the Christian Democrats, Socialist and Liberals on some of the major political issues on the medium and long-term agenda of the EU (Hix and Lord 1997:67-73). The reflections by Hix and Lord are shared by Paul Lewis, who are determined that Europeanization has served as a guiding principle for the transformation in Central and Eastern Europe, especially for political parties and party systems (Lewis 2007a:1). Parties in Eastern Europe have clearly been based on Western ideals and transnational party groups or equivalent associations in the European Parliament has played a large role in shaping new parties after the accession in 2004, through both offering various advantages and apply conditions for accession (Lewis 2007a:1; Pridham 2001:195-6).

¹³ European People's Party and European Democrats, Party of European Socialists and European Liberal Democrat and Reform Party. Present day names are used, but all three groups have changed their name reflecting additions to the group as the EU expanded.

Empirical examples of the direct pressure by European party groups can be seen in several countries. In 1999, the EPP-ED put severe pressure on the Latvian Party for Homeland and Freedom (TB/LNNK) and scrutinized closely the leaders' support to the Meciar regime in Slovakia and their stance on minority rights. The EPP-ED working group on Central and Eastern Europe made public that the party group would cease all contact with the TB/LNNK if they declined to support a new law that would guarantee minority rights for Russians in Latvia (Dakowska 2002:283). Others cases are how the EPP-ED used associated German political foundations as their agents, promoting values and positions of the Christian Democrat federation and encouraging interlocutors to apply the EPP-ED. Similar procedures are also undertaken by foundations associated with the PES (Dakowska 2002:287-290). The effect is seen in the composition of party programs of Central and Eastern European parties, which bears a clear resemblance to the programs of their new friends in the West (Dakowska 2002:290; 2007:15; Lewis 2007a:9; Pridham 2001:196).

Researchers do not exclusively praise the influence of European party groups, they also point to some obvious pitfalls. Several see it as problematic that Central and Eastern party systems still are not completely stable and Lewis argues that only the Hungarian the Czech party systems can be called stable (Lewis 2007a:8; Pridham 2001:179). As emphasized by Hix and Lord, the need for oversized majorities in the Union tends to suspend party politics, as all major European party families prefer to agree in order to reach a clear majority (Hix and Lord 1997:17).

Another major point clearly relevant for this thesis concerns the ideological differences between Western and Central and Eastern Europe. Giorgia Delsoldato argues that the emerging transnational intraparty relationships must be seen in light of political cleavages. It is difficult to obtain a clear picture of party systems and the comparability of cleavages in new and old member states. Due to the importance of the politico-cultural cleavage in addition to the socioeconomic cleavages prevailing in Western Europe, two different political left and right can exist in the same party system (Delsoldato 2002:281-283). Pridham also sees the deficiencies, as Western ideological concepts are very broad and may not be transferable to Central and Eastern Europe. Similar concerns are shared by Olson, who questions the similarity of party systems based on the differences in issue alignments (Olson 1998; Pridham 1981).

PRR-parties have during their existence changed from being initially positive to the European Union to a point where a large majority of parties now are Euro-skeptics or even Euro-rejects. Due to the central placement of nationalism in their ideology it is not surprising how, as the Union consistently grew more supranational, especially after the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, PRR-parties changed their view on the Union, instead preferring a different direction based on a number of equally diffusing concepts, such as “Europe of Nations, “Europe of the Fatherlands” and so on (Mudde 2007:158-167). The various concepts also represent an ideological division between potential parties for a transnational right-wing group. A disagreement between the Vlaams Belang (VB) and Front National (FN), on whether to support ethnic nationalism based on the ethnic communities of Europe or state nationalism based on the existing European states, has also been a source of conflict (Mudde 2007:167).

The various right-wing parties of the European Parliament have made several attempts at creating a stable and lasting party federation. However, they have experienced a number of difficulties such as electoral thresholds, a continuing rotation of parties and lack of cooperation (Mudde 2007:177-181). The first right-wing group in the EP was “Group of the European Right” in the period between 1984-1989 with FN and Italian Social Movement (MSI) as the largest parties. The group was dominated by the FN leader, Jean Marie Le Pen and the French party has consistently proved to be the most eager supporter of a “nationalist international” (Mudde 2007:174-8). In the next period between 1989 and 1994 Le Pen decided to go along with the German Republikaner (Rep), after he feuded with the MSI over South Tyrol. Internal difficulties ended the group de facto in 1991/2 (Hix and Lord 1997:107; Mudde 2007:178). The inclusion of Austria in 1996 proved to be a disappointment as the FPÖ refused to participate in a party alliance, leaving the populist radical right MEPs in a state of turmoil in the period between 1994 and 1999. In June 1999 a new group of unattached MEPs founded the “Technical Group for Non-Attached Members – Mixed Group” (TDI). This attempt also proved to be futile as it was dissolved twice by the EP and finally for good in October 2001 (Mudde 2007:179).

The potential for a more homogenous right-wing group increased with the accession of new member states in 2004. In the following EP elections eight parties belonging to the larger right-wing family obtained seats, 30 in total, enough to compose a separate political group. But instead the MEPs started off in three different groups, Independence/Democracy, Union for Europe of the Nations or unattached (EU.int 2008). But the acceptance of Romania and

Bulgaria as EU members in 2007 increased the number of MEPs associated with the populist radical right (Abramsohn 2007). Shortly after the expansion plans for a new right-wing group intensified and on the 9th of January 2007 “Identity, Tradition and Sovereignty” was born under the leadership of MEP Bruno Gollnisch of the FN (Mahony 2007a). But as with all the previous attempts at group formation the ITS folded after the Romanian MEPs from PRM¹⁴ accused Alessandra Mussolini of being xenophobic. No longer fulfilling the minimum number of MEPs, the group was dissolved in November the same year (Mahony 2007b; Banks 2007). Outside of the EP the contact between parties has been mainly at an individual level and while numerous attempts have been made to establish contact, they have more often than not failed. This has made John Loyd argue that no “populist international with closely similar parties exists” (Loyd 2003:88). The most recent attempt at creating a transnational party federation has been “Euronat”, initiated by Le Pen and the FN with the appeal: “nationalists of all countries unite” (Mudde 2007:158). But also the Euronat has lived what Mudde describes as a “shadowy existence (Mudde 2007:176).

While transnational party groups on a general level seems to have had a converging effect on parties in Central and Eastern Europe, it is equally clear that the consistent resources and efforts put down by mainstream party groups has lacked from the populist radical right (Lewis 2007b:187). Ideological and personal differences have too many times come in the way for stable and long lasting co-operation. It is therefore plausible to assume that whatever convergence the European Union has provided for party systems on Central and Eastern Europe not necessarily can be transferred to also account for PRR-parties.

2.4 Summary of the theoretical argument

Throughout this chapter I have presented the theoretical arguments for why a pan-European analysis of PRR-parties can not be taken for granted. The chapter started off with a discussion of terminology and definitions where I highlighted a definitional conflict between van der Brug and colleagues and Cas Mudde on the definition of PRR-parties. The role of immigration for Western European PRR-parties and its presence in most definitions in the previous literature creates problems when we know that immigration is not a politicized issue in Central and Eastern Europe. While calling for a more elaborate discussion on the pan-

¹⁴ Greater Romania Party

European approach, I acknowledge at the same time the overall quality in “Populist radical right parties in Europe” (Mudde 2007) and have used the PRR-term throughout the thesis.

The second section deals with the political issues most commonly connected with PRR-parties. Following the line of thought that major societal changes are necessary to create a niche for a new party, hypotheses are constructed around a number of issues. The issues are primarily drawn from the literature on Western European parties, but I have added theoretical insight on several issues thought to be more prominent in Central and Eastern Europe, such as extremist attitudes, a more authoritarian leadership and the possibility for leftist economic policies. All hypotheses, except for H6 on economic preferences, have been given a geographical direction.

Following the political issues, I have pointed to two areas that on a theoretical level questions the convergence between Western European and Central and Eastern European PRR-parties. Two different forms of nationalism may have created different political atmospheres, which can contribute to the more radical and extreme political discourse in Central and Eastern Europe. Also, the presence of a transnational party group, connected to the European Parliament, has more or less been non-existing for PRR-parties.

Having presented the theoretical framework, the next chapter will continue by outlining the methodology, operationalization and data for the analysis of the thesis.

3. Methodology, data and operationalizations

According to King, Keohane and Verba (1994:9) the content of scientific research is the methods and rules of research. The importance of being aware of the most suitable method and be able to conduct it is therefore immense. This chapter will first account for my methodological choices, then proceed to cover the data used in the thesis. The final part of the chapter describes the measurement validity and operationalization of the variables.

3.1 Research strategy: Quantitative method

Every research project must be explicit on the goal of the study (King et al. 1994:75); is it to give descriptive or causal inferences? My thesis aims to discover causal inferences on which issues that mobilize PRR-voters in Europe. In order to do so, I have chosen to use a quantitative method. Methodological approaches within political science are normally divided into two separate camps. You can either adapt a small-N in-depth, qualitative approach, or a large-N generalizing, quantitative approach. The quantitative approach can again be broken down into cross-sectional, panel data and multi-level analysis. The debate between quantitative and qualitative method is a heated discussion and Lijphart comments that “if at all possible one should generally use the statistical (or perhaps even the experimental method instead of the weaker comparative method” (Lijphart 1971:685), I am, however, just going to argue that a quantitative approach is more suitable for my thesis.

The nature of my research question constitutes a large-N study. When dealing with ten different countries, parties and 7 000 plus observations, it is necessary to use statistical techniques in order to reveal which issues mobilize PRR-voters in Europe. Quantitative method is superior when it comes to drawing conclusions based on a large population (George and Bennett 2004:30-31; Mahoney 2003:354). Reducing the number of cases would weaken the thesis when placing the thesis in relations to Mudde (2007) and is not an alternative. To have many observations is important as my focus is on voters, – a large-N quantity, if wanting to generalize.

A statistical analysis can also more accurately provide a measure of how strong the impact of an independent variable is on the dependent variable. While qualitative methods may be more appropriate in theory-generating studies, statistical methods are better at estimating causal

effects and effect on a large spectrum of observations (George and Bennett 2004:25). Since my goal is to perform an empirical test of Mudde's pan-European argument, a quantitative approach is well suited.

A potential pitfall with a quantitative approach and an advantage with qualitative method is the closeness to both research objects and concepts (George and Bennett 2004:17). Charles Ragin is of the understanding that by using a quantitative approach the researchers misses out on an important process of learning to know the different observations, creating a longer distance between researcher and objects of research (Ragin 2004:128). While this may be true, quantitative approaches can remedy these shortcomings by obtaining a keen theoretical insight, and be observant of guidelines to achieve good validity (Adcock and Collier 2001:174; King et al. 1994).

On the basis of a desire to generalize by testing theory on a large number of observations, I am of the opinion that a quantitative approach is best suited for my thesis. In the following sub-chapter I will explain in detail my method of choice.

3.2 Logistic regression


My dependent variable is a dichotomy, where a respondent can either have voted for a PRR-party or not. In such cases, logistic regression or probit regression are the most used statistical techniques. The two forms of binary regression are very similar, the difference being slightly different forms on the regression curve and a different way of transforming the dependent variable. Differences in results are very small and the selection of logistic regression ahead of probit regression should not effect the results (Skog 2004:390).

Though the fundamental line of thought of logistic and OLS-regression is similar, they have important differences at detail level (Skog 2004:352). The most important difference between logistic regression and multiple regressions is that the binary structure of the dependent variable has properties that violate the assumptions of OLS regression. The error term of a discrete variable follows the binomial distribution instead of the normal distribution; this invalidates statistical testing based on assumptions of normality. Second, the variance of a dichotomous variable is not constant, creating instances of heteroscedasticity. Logistic regression also predicts probability for an event to occur within the range of 0 and 1, which is not necessary in OLS regression (Hair et al. 2005:356-7).

3.2.1 Recoding into logit-values

Since the binary variable only has two outcomes, 0 and 1, the predicted value must fall within the same range. To express this range, logistic regression uses the logistic curve to represent the relationship between the dependent variable and independent variables. Given a positive coefficient, when the value on the independent variable decreases, the probability approaches 0, but never reaches it. When the value on the independent value increases, the probability approaches 1, but never reaches it. This gives the relationship a non-linear form.

Figure 1 Illustration of non-linearity



To prevent the probabilities from exceeding the range between 0 and 1, and to obtain a metric variable with both negative and positive values, the probability value is transformed in a two-step process. First the probability is restated as *odds* – the ratio of the probability of the two potential outcomes (Hair et al. 2005:359).

$$Odds = Prob_i \div (1 - Prob_i).$$

A simple example serves to illustrate the relationship between probability and odds. If you have ten cases, with eight of them being successful and two of them being a failure. The probability for success is 0.8 ($8 \div 10$). The odds would then be:

$$0.8 \div (1 - 0.8) = 4.0$$

The odds of success are 4.0 or four times more likely to have a success than a failure. A probability of 0.5 – equal chance – results in odds of 1.0. Thus if the odds are over 1.0 it

corresponds to a probability above 0.5 and vice versa with an odds under 1.0 (Hair et al. 2005:359). This way the odds represent a metric variable that can always be reverted back into a probability between 0 and 1. However, odds can only have values between 0 and infinite positive values. This is solved through the *logit value* which is found by taking the logarithm of the odds.

$$\text{Logit} = \log (\text{Prob}_i \div (1 - \text{Prob}_i))$$

Odds greater than 1.0 will have a positive logit value and odds less than 1.0 will have a negative logit value. Through the transformation from probabilities, through odds and ending up with a logit value, the dependent variable is now metric and can have both positive and negative values and still be transformed back into a probability between 0 and 1 (Hair et al. 2005:360).

3.2.2 Model estimation

The nonlinearity present in the dichotomous dependent variable prevents us from using the least squares method known from multiple regression. Instead, logistic regression makes use of the *maximum likelihood procedure*. The procedure maximizes the likelihood for an event to occur. It is a method that produces measures of goodness-of-fit of the estimated model. The most basic measure is the *likelihood value*. Logistic regression measures the estimation fit through taking the value of -2 times the log of the likelihood value, referred to as $-2LL$. A perfect fit would be give a likelihood of 1 and a $-2LL$ of 0. Thus, the lower $-2LL$ the better model fit. The $-2LL$ value can be used to compare between models, comparable to the R^2 measure in multiple regression. Other measures called named *Pseudo R^2 measures* give a value that can also be used to compare models. The measure used in this thesis, adjusted McFadden's R^2 , compares the model fit with the actual observations on a range between 0 and 1, while adjusting for the number of variables added (Long and Freese 2006:109). The higher score, the better the model explains the actual observations. The fit is measured through a likelihood ratio, where the likelihood value in the model with just the intercept is divided on the model with independent variables included. A value very close to 0 indicates that the model does not fit better than a horizontal line, while a value close to 1 indicates a perfect fit. A fourth way to measure the goodness-of-fit is through a classification matrix that gives you a hit ratio of how well the model is able to predict observations into the right category on the dependent variable (0 or 1) (Hair et al. 2005:361-363). However, since the

sample of observations will be different for my models, depending on the regional focus, the model comparisons do not contribute much to compare between regions. All values will be reported, but cannot be used to compare across samples.

3.2.3 Interpreting coefficients

Compared to OLS regression, the interpretation of the coefficients is not as straightforward. Due to the nonlinear structure, the probability of the dependent variable does not increase by the same value for each increase of one on the independent variable. Because of the multiplicative logic, the effect of the independent variable depends on which level it is at. It is also affected by x-values on other independent variables included in the model. This is illustrated by figure 1 (p.39), where the probability at first does not increase very much, then takes a steep climb at -2 before it flattens while approaching a probability of 1.

As explained in section 3.2.1, the probability has been recoded into odds and then logit values. This complicates the interpretation of the original coefficients as they only tell us the change in logit values. They can however tell us the direction of the relationship through the sign of the coefficient. In order to make interpretation easier statistical programs include an exponentiated coefficient which takes the anti-log of the original coefficient and thus reflects changes in odds-ratios instead of the logit-value (Hair et al. 2005:364). Through taking the anti-log of the original coefficients the exponentiated coefficient is actually stated in odds. Exponentiated coefficients above 1.0 will represent a positive relationship whereas coefficients under 1.0 will represent a negative relationship¹⁵.

Table 1 Coefficient interpretation

Logistic coefficient	Reflects changes in....
Original	Logit (logged odds)
Exponentiated	Odds (e^{logit})

Source: (Hair et al. 2005)

The magnitude of change is thus best measured through the exponentiated coefficients as systematized in the following expression:

$$\text{Percentage change in odds} = (\text{Exponentiated coefficient}_i - 1.0) \times 100$$

¹⁵ This is because odds of 1.0 is reversed back into a probability of .50 where each outcome is equally probable.
 $\text{Prob} = \text{Odds} \div (1 + \text{Odds}) \rightarrow \text{Prob} = 1.0 \div (1+1.0) = .50$

As mentioned, it is important to note that in logistic regression the impact of the independent variables is multiplicative not additive. The new odds is therefore calculated through the multiplicative equation underneath

$$\text{New odds value} = \text{Old odds value} \times \text{Exponentiated coefficient} \times \text{Change in independent variable}$$

In a situation where the old odds are 1.0 when the independent variable has a value of 6.5 and the exponentiated coefficient is 2.5, an increase on the independent variable of 2 units would give new odds of 5¹⁶. As established the old odds of 1.0 would give a probability of .50, whereas a two unit increase on the independent variable would give a probability of .833¹⁷, an increase in probability of 33,3 per cent. Note that because of the non-linearity another increase of two units would not add another 33,3 per cent chance as that would make the probability greater than 100 per cent. Instead the multiplicative logic gives a new odds of 25¹⁸, which in turn gives a probability of .96¹⁹, an increase of roughly 12 per cent from the first calculation (Hair et al. 2005:364-366).

The method used to interpret dummy variables is slightly different. Since it only has two values, the dummy tells us whether or not a characteristic is present or absent. In this case the exponentiated coefficient represents the level of the dependent variable for the represented group versus the omitted. It is therefore of great importance to know which group is coded what. The relationship between the two categories can be stated as follows:

$$\text{Odds}_{\text{represented category}} = \text{Exponentiated coefficient} \times \text{Odds}_{\text{reference category}}$$

In the case of gender, if women are coded as 1 and the exponentiated coefficient is 1.25, then females have 25 per cent higher odds than males (1.25-1 = .25). A negative exponentiated coefficient would indicate that females have a lower odds than men (Hair et al. 2005:367).

¹⁶ New odds = 1 x 2,5 x 2 = 5

¹⁷ Prob = 5 ÷ (1+5) = .833

¹⁸ New odds = 5 x 2,5 x 2 = 25

¹⁹ Prob = 25 ÷ (1+25) = .96

Interpreting the coefficients in a meaningful way is a problem with logistic regression. Of the three different measures²⁰ and ways to interpret coefficients, each have different advantages and disadvantages. The impact of logit values and odds-ratios does not vary depending on the x-value, but tell little about the substantive effect due to the complicated mathematical logic behind the values. Probabilities, on the other hand, are easier to interpret in a meaningful way, but vary depending on the value on both its own x-axis and those of other independent variables.

When variables are measured on different scales or different units in linear regression, we use standardized coefficients in order to compare the strength between variables. A similar process can be made in logistic regression, but it requires a lengthy process of calculation.

In multiple regression the standardized coefficients (beta) is calculated by using the unstandardized coefficient and the standard deviation of X and Y in the following relationship

$$\beta = b_1 \cdot \frac{S_x}{S_y}$$

The transformation from unstandardized coefficients to standardized coefficients causes a change in measuring units from the original units of the variables to standard deviations. The standardized coefficient indicates how many standard deviations of change in the dependent variable is associated with an increase of one standard deviations in the independent variable (Menard 2002:45). Thus variables with different units are now measured on the same scale of units.

In logistic regression is not as easy to transform unstandardized coefficients into standardized coefficients. This is due to the fact that in logistic regression it is not the value of Y, but the probability when Y has a specific value that is predicted. As recalled from section 3.2.1 the dependent variable in logistic regression is not the actual Y-value, but logit (Y). From the transformation in linear regression we saw that the standard deviation is an important measure in order to calculate standardized coefficients, unfortunately it is not possible to directly calculate the standard deviation of logit values (Menard 2002:46). However, an equation presented by Scott Menard shows how the standardized coefficients can be calculated by

²⁰ Probabilities, odds-ratios and logit-values

using the predicted values of logit (\hat{y}) and the explained variance, R^2 . In regression, the variance explained (R^2) is calculated by taking the regression sum of squares (SSR) and divide it by the total sum of squares (SST). Menard explains that by dividing both by the sample size, the variance explained equals the variance of the predicted values of the dependent variable divided by the variance of the dependent variable.

$$\underline{R^2 = SSR / SST = (SSR / N)(SST / N) = S_{\hat{y}}^2 / S_y^2}$$

Furthermore this equation can be rearranged into

$$\underline{S_y^2 = S_{\hat{y}}^2 / R^2}$$

By substituting all the Y values with logit (Y) values we get an expression for the variance of logit (Y) and furthermore by taking the square root of the variance we now find ourselves with an expression of the standard deviation of logit (Y) that can be inserted into the equation below that finally calculates the standard coefficients.

$$\underline{\beta = (b_1)(S_x) / \sqrt{S_{\log it(\hat{y})}^2} / R^2 = (b_1)(S_x)(R) / S_{\log it(\hat{y})}}$$

In this equation b_1 is the unstandardized logistic coefficient, S_x is the standard deviation of the independent variable X, $\underline{S_{\log it(\hat{y})}^2}$ is the standard deviation of the of logit (\hat{Y}) , and R^2 is the explained variance (Menard 2002:46). This is a process that is done automatically in the statistical package STATA, through the *spost-command*, which will be used for my analysis.

The standardized coefficients are interpreted in the same manner as in linear regression. An increase of one standard deviation in the independent variable X is associated with a standard deviation change in logit (Y). This makes it easier to compare the impact of the independent variables. In his example, Menard shows how the perceived magnitudes based on odds-ratio and logit values turned out to be quite different when measured through standardized coefficients (Menard 2002:47-48)

Though standardized coefficients appear to be very useful it must be noted that its use has been the subject of debate (Bring 1994; Greenfeld 1995; Newman and Browner 1991). While standardized coefficients are used in the thesis they are one of several statistical measures that are used and the results of the analysis does not exclusively rest on the standardized coefficients. The standardized coefficients are also only meaningful for the metric variables and will be discussed for those exclusively.

3.2.4 Assumptions of logistic regression

Even though a number of assumptions connected to the normal distribution of error terms, as known from OLS regression, do not apply for logistic regression, three important assumptions must be fulfilled.

First, the relationship between the variables must be S-shaped, i.e. non-linear, and linear when described through the logit scale. The form of the regression curve can be calculated statistically by using the Hosmer-Lemeshow-test. If the H-L-test is significant there are significant differences between actual and predicted values, the model is not S-shaped, thus the lower significance the better (Hair et al. 2005:372; Skog 2004:383-385). Problems can be remedied through different strategies like constructing a polynomial variable, including dummy variables or perform a non-linear recoding of the independent variable in question (Skog 2004:385).

The second assumption, that the error terms are uncorrelated with each other, is in most cases satisfied if the data have been selected through a random sample, which is the case for my data. It is more relevant in longitudinal studies and multi-level studies where one case makes several observations when you follow it over time. However, it may still be an issue between observations within the same country. The third and final assumption is that the independent variable and the error term must be uncorrelated (Skog 2004:380). Such a correlation would generally indicate a misspecification in terms of bias, inefficiency or inaccurate inferences (Menard 2002:71).

3.3 Data

The datasets considered for this thesis have been European Social Survey (ESS), International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), European Election Studies (EES), Eurobarometer (EB) and European Values Study (EVS). After thorough consideration I decided to use the European

Value Study as my main data source. This decision was based on several criteria. First of all it included party choice as a variable. Second, it was the best data set available both when it came to the number of observations, relevant parties and suitable variables.

The European Values Study is the European branch of the World Value Study and has been collected in three separate rounds²¹ with a fourth round due to be released late in 2009. The EVS is a large-scale, cross-national longitudinal survey research program carried out by the European Values Study Foundation. The last round from 1999/2000 consisted of data from 33 European countries, covering a variety of topics. Some of the most central questions raised by the survey are “do Europeans share common values?, are values changing in Europe and, if so, in what directions” (EVS 2009; Gesis 2009). The EVS has been used in a large number of articles by noted scholars such as Seymour Martin Lipset, Ronald Inglehart and Juan Linz (EVS 2009). In addition it has also been used in previous research on the PRR (Karvonen 1997).

The complete dataset contains 39 797 respondents with national samples varying from 967 in Iceland to 2500 in Russia. In total 74 per cent of the interviews were done face-to-face while the remaining 26 per cent were done by phone. With the exception of Greece (which is not included in my analysis) all surveys were conducted by professional survey organizations. In all non-English speaking countries the questionnaire was translated into the native tongue. The respondents were selected through random sampling of the entire adult population with the exceptions noted in the footnote²². The precise sampling methods are available in the main questionnaire from the EVS web page. The average response rate is 62.9 per cent. However, a few countries were missing from the overview in the codebook or reported the non-response rate in age-divided categories, making it impossible to calculate it into the average. For the countries used in my analysis the response rate was higher than the overall average at 66.7 per cent, but this figure is missing 2 out of 11 countries due to the reasons mentioned above. Still, the response rate is acceptable, but not exceptionally good. The data are not weighted, but the number of respondents is adjusted according to the size of the country.

²¹ 1981, 1990, 1999/2000

²² Iceland 18-80 years of age Sweden 18-76 years of age, Romania – non-Romanian citizens excluded, Slovenia – institutionalized people i.e. prisons, monasteries, mental institutions etc

3.3.1 My use of the EVS

The complete dataset contains observations from 33 countries, but my thesis will only include data from 10 countries, 5 from WE and 5 from CEE. As I position my thesis close to Cas Mudde's "Populist radical right parties in Europe", it seems natural to only include the parties present in his analysis to make my empirical test of his pan-European argument as accurate as possible. Mudde identifies twelve parties, of which the EVS contains observations for eleven. Another reason for leaving out countries without PRR-parties from the analysis is the difference between electoral breakthrough and electoral persistence of the parties (Mudde 2007). Such an analysis would have to include a more overall picture of both supply and demand-side variables and is beyond the scope of this thesis. The dataset is cross-sectional only containing data from the last round.

Table 2 PRR-parties identified by Mudde

Countries	Party	High score	Included in thesis
Austria	Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ)	26,9 (1999)	Yes
Belgium	Front national (Belge) (FNb)	6,9 (1995)	Yes
Belgium	Vlaams Belang (VB)	16,8 (2003)	Yes
Croatia	Hrvatska strnaka prava (HSP)	6,8 (1992)	Yes
Denmark	Dansk Folkeparti (DFP)	13,2 (2005)	Yes
France	Front national (FN)	14,9 (1997)	Yes
Germany	Die Republikaner (REP)	2,1 (1990) ^a	Yes
Hungary	Magyar Ignazság és Élet Pártja (MIEP)	5,5 (1998)	Yes
Poland	Liga Polskich Rodzin (LPR)	8,0 (2005)	No
Romania	Partidul România Mare (PRM)	19,5 (2000)	Yes
Russia	Liberal'no-demokraticeskoi partii Rossii (LDPR)	22,9 (1993)	Yes
Slovakia	Slovenská národná strana (SNS)	11,7 (2006)	Yes

Notes: ^a The REP gained 7,1 % in the (nationwide) European Elections of 1989

Source: (Mudde 2007:44)

This selection leaves me with a total of 15088 observations from 10 countries, further reduced to 11442 when leaving out those who have not answered which party they would vote for. Out of these 11442 there are 691 PRR-observations. 411 out of 6223 come from WE and 280 out of 5219 come from CEE (see appendix). Respondents who have answered that they did not vote or cast a blank vote is included in the non-PRR segment as they are not motivated by issues fronted by PRR-parties, and as such have deemed them not an alternative.

Unfortunately, the number of observations from each party is not sufficient to undertake separate analyses by country. In order to overcome this problem the observations are put together in two separate groups, either in a WE-bloc or a CEE-bloc. This is not ideal as there are most likely some national differences between countries (Anastasakis 2000; Schain et al.

2002). However, the inclusion of national dummy variables can reveal whether there is a significant difference after the national variation has been accounted for.

3.3.2 Reliability and validity

Two central concepts in all social science research are reliability and validity. Achieving good levels of reliability and validity is highlighted by King and colleagues (1994:25-26) as crucial elements of how to obtain good data quality. Reliability is, when thought of, fairly easy to achieve in quantitative analyses. It is simply put a measure of how reliable your data are. When you apply the same operations in the same way on the same data, the results should also remain the same (King et al. 1994:25-26).

There are primarily two types of reliability; stability and equivalence (Grønmo 2004:222). *Stability* refers to the degree of accordance between data-collections gathered at different points of time with the same tools. *Equivalence* is based on accordance between independent data collections at the same time (Grønmo 2004:222-223). Data would thus have a better reliability if several independent researchers obtained the same results with different data.

Overall, the reliability shows to what degree variations in the data depends on aspects of the data collection or whether there is actual variation.

Validity is a question about whether we measure what we want to do or not. Again the term is divided into two main types. External validity measures whether or not the observations are true for the entire population, while internal validity is whether or not the operationalizations represent the theoretical concept (Midtbø 2007:25). Measuring validity is more or less a question of judgment. But there are also different quantitative techniques, like constructing indexes that can be applied to increase the internal validity.

I consider the reliability of my data to be good. The collection procedure is documented in the EVS codebook and webpage and is thus replicable. As a test I checked the mean placement on a left-right scale in France for the EVS and the ESS and the difference was 0.13 (4.88 vs. 4.75), indicating good equivalent reliability. Through random sampling the observations in the dataset, and without any systematized bias, it also has good external validity. Discussions of internal validity will be discussed at length in the following sub-chapter and will not be covered here.

3.4 Operationalizations

In all research the validity of the variables are of primary importance. The following sub-chapters will account for how I have operationalized the variables and how I see them to have validity

For several of the variables I have constructed indexes to obtain better measurement of a phenomenon. First, I have used factor analysis to conduct a preliminary test if the variables load on the same dimension or not. The MSO-test should be above .500 and the Bartlett's test of sphericity should be significant. Finally, to ensure that the new variables based on the *index* has adequate reliability a *Cronbach Alpha* test is performed on the original variables, checking for internal consistency. The generally accepted level is .70 and .60 for exploratory research. However, as the reliability increases along with the number of variables, an index with few variables might yield a value of around .60 and still be acceptable (Hair et al. 2005:137). All the relevant statistical output is available in the appendix.

3.4.1 The dependent variable

The goal of my thesis is to shed new light on whether or not PRR-parties in WE and CEE mobilize voters on the same political issues. The easiest way to measure this is to see which issues make voters place a vote for a certain party during elections. The independent variable is therefore constructed around the question "which party would you vote for?" The question is applicable to all countries and has good measurement validity as it is very straightforward and extremely difficult to misinterpret. In order to create a dummy variable to represent the choice between a PRR-party and a non-PRR party the variable has been recoded. All observations of one of the parties listed in table 1 are coded as 1 – PRR, while every other party including those who indicated that they would deliberately vote blank or not post a vote, are coded as 0 – Non-PRR.

3.4.2 The independent variables

In the following section I will outline the operationalization of the independent variables. In addition to the variables given grounds for, the chapter includes a few traditional control variables with a brief explanation for why they are potentially important for the PRR-vote. All subchapters will also include a consideration of the measurement validity of the variables.

3.4.3 Who are the others

The question of who constitutes “the others” is of vital importance in any analysis of the PRR. While the consensus for WE parties is that immigration is the no.1 issue, indigenous groups seem to attract the most negative attention in CE (Mudde 2007). The theoretical section identified three different hypotheses. First, that immigration can both mobilize voters on the account of a cultural threat and through a decrease in job security. Second, I argue that the discourse around “the others” in CEE is much more radical, intolerant and biological than in WE.

To measure the perceived cultural threat I use Q75 that asks what immigrants should do culturally when arriving in a new country. If, *for the greater good of society it is better if immigrants maintain their distinct customs and traditions*, the respondent has been coded as 0. If *for the greater good of society it is better if immigrants do not maintain their distinct customs and traditions but take over the customs of the country*, the respondent has been coded as 1. The variable is an original dichotomous variable but the values have been recoded from 1 and 2 to 0 and 1.

The question reveals whether or not the respondents see the cultural aspects of immigration as damaging. If wanting immigrants to assimilate into the national culture, it reflects the focus on cultural nativism identified by Betz and Johnson, where the emphasis is on the future of a European identity and Western value system (2004:84). I find the variable to represent the theoretical element of cultural racism in a good way, thus achieving good internal validity.

To measure perceived job insecurity I use Q 74 asking how the respondents feel about people from less developed countries coming here to work. The variable has four different choices ranging from 1 – *let anyone come who wants in* to 4 – *prohibit people coming here from other countries*. In order to be able to use it in a regression analysis the variable has been recoded into a dummy where the two most positive responses have been coded 0 and the two most negative responses on foreign workers being coded 1.

The third variable is an index meant to measure what I have argued is a more radical, biological and intolerant form of expressing negativity against outsiders. It is constructed out of a set of variables asking if you would feel negative about being neighbor to a certain type of people. The dataset contains a range of groupings but I

have chosen homosexuals, gypsies, Jews and people of a different race. The neighbor-variables have previously been used by Karvonen to represent world-views and attitudes of PRR-voters in a number of Western European countries (Karvonen 1997). All four groups are identified by Mudde as outsiders in the eyes of PRR-parties (Mudde 2007).

All four questions used (Q7 I, L, M and N) are natural dummy variables with the alternatives mentioned (1) and not mentioned (0). In the additive index the scale would be from 0 - never mentioned to 4 - always mentioned for the four variables. That would make the scale unsuitable for regression analysis and so the index has been recoded into a dummy where the 0-2 has been coded as 0 - not extremist and 3-4 have been coded 1 - extremist. This way the respondents have to give a positive response on at least three variables before being coded as someone with extremist attitudes.

The KMO for the index is .721 and the Bartlett's test of sphericity is significant at the .000-level. The Cronbach Alpha is also over the minimum value reporting at .670, indicating that the index has good internal validity.

3.4.4 The protest vote

The protest element of the PRR-parties is prominent in most of the research. On an overall basis the political trust and satisfaction in WE is on the decline (Pharr and Putnam 2000), with the same poor prospect becoming increasingly visible in CEE. With falling turnouts and a lower share of votes going to mainstream parties (Eatwell 2003:51), PRR-parties represent a fresh alternative less affected by the *politikerverdrossenheit*. Political elites are more than anywhere else found in national parliaments around Europe. The variable chosen to measure if PRR-voters are mobilized on resentment for the established political elites concerns the level of confidence in national parliaments. Ideally, it would have been combined with levels of confidence in government and/or political parties, but unfortunately variables suitable for such measures are not included in the EVS. However, in most countries, especially those with a parliamentary system, the link between parliament and government is close, so that the confidence in the parliament should not differ very much from the confidence in government.

A potential drawback with the variable is that parliament is more restricted than politicians as a whole. However I believe that, much like the relationship between government and parliament, a lack of confidence in politicians as a whole is also visible in an assessment of

politicians in the parliament. The exact wording of the variable is *how much confidence in: parliament (Q58g)*. Originally the variable had four different categories ranging from *a great deal* (1) to *none at all* (4). In order to be able to use it in the analysis it has been recoded into a dummy variable. Those who expressed that they either had *a great deal* or *quite a lot* of confidence has been given the value 0 labelled *confidence*. Those who expressed *not very much* or *none at all* have been given the value 1 labelled *no confidence*.

3.4.5 The European Union

A large problem for the European Union is the lack of confidence among European citizens. It is part of a more general problem of resentment for politics and political actors. To operationalize the theoretical argument that a lack of confidence in the EU and the ideas of a supranational union mobilize PRR-voters, I have chosen a relatively straightforward variable. The variable *how much confidence in: the European Union (Q58j)* originally had four variables ranging from *a great deal* (1) to *none at all* (4). However, this is not enough values to treat it as a metric variable. Therefore it has been recoded into a dummy in order to use it in the analysis. Those who expressed either *a great deal* or *quite a lot* of confidence in the EU have been given the value 0 labelled *confidence*. Those who expressed *not very much* or *none at all* confidence in the EU have been given the value 1 labelled *no confidence*.

A potential problem with the EU-variable is that the dataset is from 1999/2000, four years before Slovakia, Hungary and Romania became members, while Russia and Croatia are still not members. A valid question is whether the data simply are outdated. While the data are nine years old, with five years of EU membership for Slovakia, Hungary and Romania having taken place in the period, they applied for membership in the mid-nineties and should thus have knowledge of the European Union before accession. On a theoretical level PRR-voters should still oppose membership in the European Union on the grounds of the ideological clash between nationalism and the supranational elements of the EU.

3.4.6 A silent counter-revolution?

Protection of the environment is an important trait connected to post-materialism, and green parties are noted to be political by-products of this value-shift (Ignazi 2007:201; Inglehart 1977). A PRR backlash against the environmental focus is therefore plausible (Ivarsflaten 2008; Lipset 1981). The variables chosen to operationalize a silent counter-revolution are therefore connected to environmentalism. If PRR-parties mobilize on resistance to the value-

shift described by Inglehart, they should voice their dissatisfaction with the increasing emphasis on the environment.

Two variables were used in an index to create a more comprehensive variable. The variables *give part of income against environmental pollution* (Q3A) and *increase taxes to prevent environmental pollution* (Q3B) created the new environment variable. While quite similar at first sight, the two variables concerns two slightly different areas of environmental protection. Variable Q3a asks whether or not one would voluntarily give up a part of the income in order to protect the environment, whereas variable Q3b sees the state take a more active role through taxation in order to protect the environment. The new variable allows for a combination of these on a larger scale. The KMO is .50, which is on the edge between acceptable and unacceptable. However, two variables are the minimum in a factor analysis and the KMO value suffers from this, therefore I deem it to be acceptable. The Bartlett's test was highly significant and the Cronbach Alpha was .805, indicating good reliability for the new variable.

The two original variables were coded from 1 (strongly agree) to 4 (strongly disagree). The new variable (additive) ranges from 1 (most positive to the environment) to 7 (most negative to the environment). Though the variable only has seven values it is enough for it to be treated as a metric variable (Midtbø 2007).

3.4.7 An authoritarian view on politics

Mudde operationalize authoritarianism in this sense as a belief in a strictly ordered society, where challenges to this authority is intolerable (Mudde 2007:23). This view is also reflected in the much earlier classic by Kitschelt, where he explains authoritarianism as a hierarchical arrangement of politics (Kitschelt and McGann 1995:2). Another important aspect with authoritarianism, which is highlighted by Hainsworth, is the emphasis on a strong state (Hainsworth 2000b:9). This seems a bit odd at first considering the perceived focus on a *lassiz-faire* approach to politics. The theoretical discussion revealed a difference between the two regions on the acceptance of democracy. Where democracy is established as “the only game in town” in WE, Minkenberg claims that parties from CEE are more “reverse-oriented” in that they are more anti-democratic (Minkenberg 2000:188; 2002:358). Years under communist rule has created a society that is more recipient of traditional authority and survival, leading up to the popularized story of how Russia needs a strong leader. The variable

connected to hypothesis 5a is as following: *is it a good having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections?* (Q62a). The variable should be well able to measure any nostalgic authoritarian feelings in CEE. Originally, it had four values ranging from *very good* (1) to *very bad* (4), but it has been recoded into a dummy. Those who answered *very good* and *fairly good* have been given the value 1 labelled *positive to strong leader* while those who answered *fairly bad* and *very bad* have been given the value 0 labelled *negative to strong leader*. The dichotomization is easier to defend due to the lack of a middle category making the two categories distinctly separate.

Unfortunately, the EVS does not contain any variable that I have deemed to be appropriate to measure hypothesis 5b - *PRR-parties in Western Europe mobilize voters who support stronger reactions to violations of the law*. This is a clear weakness of the thesis and the implications of this must be taken into account in the conclusion. I am aware that relevant variables are available in similar datasets, but an overall evaluation of the available data in relations to the thesis found the EVS to be the best choice for the thesis.

3.4.8 Economic changes

The importance of economic preferences in electoral research is not to be underestimated and the economy has had a central place in research on PRR-parties for many years, especially due to the emphasis given by Betz (1994) and Kitschelt (1995). However, as pointed out by Mudde (2007:121) the attention within the literature has started to question the neo-liberal economics normally associated with the PRR, instead pointing to nationalistic tendencies within the economy. With the pan-European perspective in mind, Radoslaw Markowski is quite clear that the traditional right-wing economics is not present in the former communist countries at all (Markowski 2002).

In order to test the mobilizing effect of economic preferences, I have constructed an index consisting of three variables. A potential flaw would be to measure left-right placement solely on the basis of a ten-point left-to-right scale. That would lead to the same validity problems experienced by Norris in her research (2005). The problem with this is that it is dependent upon a consistent understanding of the scale. My analysis includes parties from ten very different countries. The differences are especially noticeable within the economic sphere as half of the countries only have fifteen years of experience with market economy. In addition there are warnings about the understanding of the left-right scale in CEE countries

(Anastasakis 2000:26). Several argue that the ideological picture in Central and Eastern Europe is very unclear and is not a copy of the Western, thus making it more difficult to apply terms like leftist and rightist economy (Bohrer II et al. 2000; Kitschelt et al. 1999). Therefore my index is based on concrete questions about the role of the state in business and the market in general.

Keeping in mind that the index is a continuum going from left to right with an open formulated hypothesis it is important that the index has good validity in both directions.

David Harvey defines neoliberal economy as a theory of political economy that:

“proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade. The role of the state is to create and preserve an institutional framework appropriate for such practices” (Harvey 2005:2).

Furthermore state intervention should be kept at a minimum as the market should serve as an undisturbed arena of competition (Harvey 2005:26).

I argue that my index have good internal validity for rightist economic preferences based on the definition by Harvey on neo-liberalism given above. The questions cover key areas such as competition as a means to achieve success (54c), the position of the state in regards to the market (54d) and individual responsibility/entrepreneurship (54a). This indicates that the index has good internal validity for rightist economic preferences.

The opposite statements, representing the left end of the index, should ideally represent a more active role on behalf of the state, especially in terms of a better welfare system and more control over the market. The opposite angle to individual responsibility (Q54a) is a much more active role on behalf of the state in relation to its citizens. For the state to ensure that everyone is provided for, it is dependent on a well-functioning welfare system. Among the different welfare systems present in WE, Kleinman identifies the Scandinavian and the Anglo-Saxon models as the ones with the largest presence of the state (Kleinman 2002). An additional bonus with this variable is that its emphasis on the state is very useful when taking the former Communist systems into account. As claimed by Minkenberg certain CEE parties

are reverse-oriented, nurturing a nostalgic view of the Communist past. In this system, the state indeed had a very active role in ensuring that everyone were provided for, as this is a basic theoretical element of the ideology. Considering the historical element the variable should achieve good validity in CEE countries, where the extreme left value indicates moving towards the past.

In WE, a very rough division can be made between the Scandinavian and Anglo-Saxon models on one side and the Mediterranean and Corporative models on the other side. The major differences being that the first two rely on the state, whereas the latter two rely on private insurance and a larger role for the family in the care-taking of relatives (Kleinman 2002). With the left-right dichotomy being well-known in WE, the variable is able to represent different views on the involvement of the state in providing for citizens, the higher value on the 1-10 scale, the closer to a larger and active state-driven welfare state. That is the goal of many PRR-parties and should thus theoretically also be the goal of their voters if we follow the arguments of Mudde (2007:125-132). I feel that the variable has good measurement validity in both directions, ranging from complete state responsibility for the well-being of citizens to a complete individual responsibility.

The second variable (Q54c) measures the opinion of whether competition leads to success or if it brings out the worst in people. In the neo-liberal sense competition is one of the basic elements of market economy. However, opponents and sceptics to free competition make a point of accusing too much competition for lowering the quality in order to chase even bigger profits. This view is today perhaps most present in relations to privatization of the welfare state (Velferdsstaten.no 2009). Following their arguments the focus on competition may come at the expense of more important values.

Within mainstream Keynesian economics, state intervention is warranted to correct basic flaws in a free market economy. The principal difficulties are ensuring continuous full employment and controlling inflation. These problems provide a rational for state involvement in the economy and market (Stilwell 2006:357). The original variable Q54d measures whether or not the state should control firms more effectively. A stronger control of firms, the major players in a market economy, thus indicates a stronger interference in the economy and market on a general basis.

I have argued that also the leftist views presented in questions Q54 a-c-d represent a useful contrast in economic standpoints to the rightist alternatives. This makes the index able to answer the open hypothesis as the sign of the coefficient reveals whether PRR-voters prefer right or left economics and if it has a significant impact at all.

All three questions are answered on a 1-10 scale, where one is the most rightist answer and 10 is the most leftist answer. The KMO for the index is .598 and the Bartlett's test of sphericity is significant at .000-level. The reliability of the index is questionable with a Cronbach Alpha value at .516, which is under the desired value of .6. However, the low number of variables in the index and the good match between the variables and theoretical definition makes using the index defensible in my view. Since all the variables have a scale from 1-10 the new scale is additive going from three (1+1+1) to 30 (10+10+10). In order to make the interpretation easier the variable has been recoded to have a scale going from one to twenty-eight, with one being the most leftist view and twenty-eight being the most rightist view.

3.4.9 Control variables and interaction terms

In order to prevent the independent variables from being more significant than they should, I include a number of control variables. Though, less interesting from a theoretical point of view, they could complement the independent variables of interest in the final analysis (Midtbø 2007:31). The analysis will include four control variables, which all are very traditional in the sense that they cover the most important demographic aspects, and are usually included in electoral research. In addition to that they are also routinely highlighted as important aspects when describing the characteristics of a PRR-voter. I will also include dummy variables for all countries to check for variation between countries inside the two main blocks of WE and CEE.

Differences between genders occur all the time in social sciences. This is also true for the PRR-literature. A traditional view has been that men are more likely to vote for a PRR-party than women. The percentages tends to be two-thirds male and one-third female (Givens 2004). A general overview by Mudde reveals that a gender gap exists in practically all European countries (Mudde 2007:111). The variable is a dummy with female (1) and male (0). The content of the variable has not been recoded, but I changed the values from 1 and 2 to the aforementioned values. Gender is a straightforward issue and I believe that the variable has good validity.

The second control variable is age. Does the likelihood for placing a PRR-vote increase or decrease by age? A survey of the German Republikaner showed that the younger age cohorts were the most likely to vote for the Republikaner rather than a traditional mainstream right-party (Lubbers and Scheepers 2000:75). This view is supported by Betz, who says that PRR-parties on a general level have drawn younger voters, as these are not yet tied by tradition and are more volatile in their party choice. Similar findings are also reported by Givens (2005:60). The variable has been recoded from year of birth to the actual age, making it a metric variable.

The third control variable is education. The tabloid image of a PRR-voter is a young male with little education, however this might be an oversimplified picture of the relative diverse PRR-electorate (Mudde 2007). In the French case, Nonna Mayer discovers that the Front National electorate tends to be less educated (Mayer in Givens 2005:58). According to Charles Westin, education leads to a more rational view on life, one that leaves little room for ideas such as racism (Westin 2003:119). Following this line of thought education should not encourage PRR-voting. The variable ranges from 1-8, making it a metric variable suitable for multiple regression where 1 is the least education and 8 is the most education.

The final control variable asks whether the respondent is employed or not. The subject of unemployment is controversial in the literature with contradictory results (Mudde 2007:206). Jackman and Volpert (1996) find a significant correlation using macro-data, but Golder (2003) comes to a different conclusion. In his analysis unemployment is only significant when used in an interaction term with immigration. At the micro-level, status as unemployed is connected to the general theme of resentment that PRR-parties are thought to profit from. Those who report that they are unemployed have been assigned the value 1, while all others (employed, students, pensioners, voluntary unemployed etc) have been assigned the value 0. I believe the variable to have good validity.

The thesis wants to discover whether or not there are differences in the political issues that mobilize PRR-voters in WE and CEE. However, it would be utopian to believe that the two blocks are internally homogenous and researchers also question if cross-country research is possible (Anastasakis 2000; Schain et al. 2002). Therefore it is necessary to check for national variation before drawing inferences about differences between WE and CEE. The possibility of a multi-level analysis is excluded due to a low number of observations at level 2 (countries). Instead I include dummy variables for all ten countries and am able through an Wald-test to

reveal if there are significant differences between countries as well as regions. All the variables are coded 0 for “non-country x” and 1 for “country x”.

Interaction terms are included in model 6 in order to reveal whether or not there are significant differences between WE and CEE. Models 4 and 5 provide results exclusively for the two regions, but by including interaction terms and running all observations in the same model, I am able to reveal significant differences between WE and CEE. If a collective Wald-test including the original variable and the interaction term is significant, the results identified in models 4 and 5 will be more robust. The interaction term is created by taking the original variables and multiplying it with a region dummy coded 0 for CEE and 1 for WE.

4 Analysis

I will start by presenting descriptive data on all variables and comment briefly on them. Thereafter I will begin constructing the logistic regression model. The first model will only contain the dependent variable and country dummies, in order to reveal whether or not there are differences between countries that must be controlled for in the final model. The second model adds the control variables before the third model proceeds by adding the independent variables of interest. Then I will conduct separate analyses for Western Europe and Central and Eastern Europe to identify differences both between regions, but also compared to the pan-European model. Finally, a model including interaction terms will tell if the differences identified in the regional model are statistically significant.

4.1 Descriptive data

I will comment briefly on the variables, concentrating on the number of observations, mean and standard deviation, although the standard deviation makes most sense for the metric variables. The mean difference between WE and CEE is also included, a positive difference means a higher value in WE whereas a negative difference means a higher average in CEE. Only the most interesting figures will be commented on.

Table 3 Descriptive statistics of the variables

Variable	N	Mean	Std.dev	Min	Max	WE	CEE	Diff.
Party	11442	.07	.238	0	1	.07	.05	.02
Region	15088	.54	.499	0	1	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
Lack of confidence - EU	12959	.59	.492	0	1	.41	.41	.0
Lack of confidence - Parliament	14277	.66	.473	0	1	.40	.26	.14
Environment – no financial support	14002	4.20	1.742	1	7	4.42	3.93	.49
Strong leader	13704	.29	.454	0	1	.24	.36	-.12
Cultural resistance – Immigration	12910	.66	.474	0	1	.76	.53	.23
Employment resistance - Immigration	14437	.58	.493	0	1	.59	.58	.01
Extreme attitudes	13860	.25	.433	0	1	.15	.39	-.24
Economic preferences	13747	16.72	5.954	1	28	17.61	15.62	1.99
Age	15077	46.95	17.142	16	102	47.73	46.05	1.68
Female	15088	.54	.498	0	1	.54	.55	-.01
Education	14959	4.48	2.136	1	8	4.26	4.72	-.46
Unemployment	15002	.079	.269	0	1	.067	.092	-.025

The dependent variable *Party* has 11442 observations, 3646 observations less than the total dataset. This represents the maximum of observations included in the analysis. The mean of .07 tells us that the number of non-PRR voters greatly exceeds the number of PRR-voters.

The mean difference between WE and CEE is small, .02, indicating that there are slightly more PRR-voters in WE than in CEE.

The two variables connected to political disillusionment, *Lack of confidence - EU* and *Lack of confidence Parliament* both reveal that a majority of respondents lack confidence in the respective institutions with the mean being .59 for EU and .66 for the national Parliaments. It is interesting to note that on average, national parliaments have lower levels of confidence than the European Union.

For *Environment – no financial support*, the mean value is unexpectedly lower in CEE, indicating a more positive attitude towards paying taxes in order to preserve the environment. This is surprising, as one would expect CEE-citizens to be less post-materialist than in WE based on the prerequisite of economic security (Inglehart 1977:3)

Cultural resistance – Immigration and *Employment resistance - Immigration* concerns attitudes towards immigration/immigrants where a mean value above .5 would indicate a majority of restrictive attitudes. Somewhat surprisingly, this is the case for both variables. Considering the low number of PRR-voters in the analysis when compared to the overall number, this implies that attitudes towards immigration/immigrants on a general basis is quite restrictive in Europe. When the mean values are broken down to region-level, a clear difference between regions with regards to the *Cultural resistance - Immigration* variable is visible. It is surprising to see such a high mean value for WE, a region that often is stressed as being tolerant.

Extremist attitudes has a mean value of .249. The difference in means between this variable and the Immigration-variables, points in the direction of *Extremist attitudes* indeed being more extremist. If the mean had been about the same as for the immigration-variables it could have been argued that all three variables were at the same attitude-level, but the lower average value tells us that fewer respondents have extremist thoughts. On a descriptive level it seems like the view of “the other” (Mudde 2007) differs from the cultural aspect in WE to the extremist view in CEE.

The *Economic preferences* variable is the one with the most values, ranging from 1 to 28, with the highest value indicating the strongest preference for right-wing economics. The mean

value for all respondents is 16.72, indicating that the average placement is just to the right of the centre if we visualize the 1-28 range as a left-right axis. A standard deviation of 5.94 indicates a relatively big dispersion on the variable.

Table 4 **Significance testing of means – CEE subtracted from WE**

Variable	T-value	Sig.level	Mean difference
Lack of confidence – EU	-.16	.868	.0
Lack of confidence – Parliament	18.16	.000	.14
Environment – no financial support	-16.59	.000	.49
Strong leader	15.08	.000	-.12
Cultural resistance – Immigration	-28.87	.000	.23
Employment resistance – Immigration	-1.32	.188	.01
Extreme attitudes	25.99	.000	-.24
Economic preferences	-19.71	.000	1.99

A negative t-value corresponds to a higher mean value in Western Europe. The table above shows that there are significant differences between the means for the independent variables of interest in Central and Eastern Europe and Western Europe. All variables, except *Lack of confidence – EU* and *Cultural resistance to immigration*, have significant differences in the mean between the two regions. Although this does not confirm that PRR-parties mobilize on different issues, it serves to strengthen the assumption that such a difference exists between Western and Central and Eastern Europe.

4.2 Model 1: The effect on PRR-voting in pan-Europe – country dummies only

I begin to construct the pan-European model, by first adding country dummies to the analysis. Even though the focus of the thesis is to test which political issues that mobilize PRR-voters, it is necessary to control for differences between countries in the analysis. It is very likely that the national context has an effect on the party choice, and the inclusion of country dummies is able to test if such a difference is statistically significant. This will be conducted by using the Wald test and the Likelihood Ratio-test to examine if the null-hypothesis can be rejected. In this case the null-hypothesis will be that there are no differences between countries. The tests measure whether difference between models are a coincidence or a result of actual differences, a significant value enables us to reject the null hypothesis (Skog 2004:374).

The model includes nine country-dummies with Croatia being the reference category. The coefficients in the model explains whether or not the variable has a significant difference when compared to the reference category and is thus not very interesting for the research question and will subsequently not be commented on. Considering the large number of

respondents .05-level will be the desired cut-off point for significant results. One-tailed tests were considered for some of the variables, but they were either insignificant regardless of a one-tailed test, or not theoretically suitable for one-tailed tests

Table 5 Model 1: The effect on PRR-voting in Pan-Europe – country dummies only

Variable	Coef.	Z	P> z	Odds ratio	Std.Coeff.
France	-.367	-1.39	.166	.692	-.058
Germany	-.907	-3.25	.001*	.404	-.162
Austria	.1.72	8.03	.000*	5.582	.261
Belgium	.626	2.78	.005*	1.871	.104
Denmark	.131	0.51	.610	1.141	.018
Slovakia	.699	3.06	.002*	2.012	.107
Hungary	-.758	-2.31	.021*	.468	-.098
Romania	.195	.75	.456	1.215	.025
Russia	.447	2.01	.044*	1.563	.084
Constant	-3.181	-15.89			
LR chi2(9)	370.00	HL chi2(7)	0.00		
Prob > chi2	0.000	Prob > chi2	1.000		
McFaddens Adj. R ²	.067	-2LL	4848.5518		
N = 11442					

* Significant at the .05-level (two-tailed)

The model with only the country dummies does not explain very much. The McFadden's Adj. R² is .067. The Hosmer-Lemeshow test is far from significant, indicating that the model fits the logistic curve. The -2LL value is 4848.5518 and is noted for future comparison with larger models. The coefficients, though not of great importance at this stage, must be interpreted in relation to the reference category.

What is important at this stage is whether the country dummies collectively are significant, making it possible to reject the null-hypothesis and conclude that there exist significant differences between the countries included in the analysis that must be controlled for.

Table 6 Wald-test & LR-test of country differences

Wald-test		LR-test	
Chi2(9)	355.84	Chi2(9)	370.00
Prob > chi2	0.000	Prob > chi2	0.000

Both tests show a significant value, meaning that the null-hypothesis, no variation between countries, is rejected. The reason for doing this is to control for country specific factors that may influence the results. As a consequence of the significant results, the country dummies must be included in the larger models to control for this variation.

4.3 Model 2: The effect on PRR-voting in pan-Europe – with control variables

Added to model 1 are the variable *Age* – how old the respondents are, *Female* – the sex of the respondents, *Unemployed* – is the respondent unemployed and *Education* – the level of education.

Table 7 Model 2: The effect on PRR-voting in Pan-Europe – with control variables

Variable	Coef.	Std.err	Z	P> z	Odds ratio	Std. Coeff.
France	-.491	.275	-1.79	.074	.612	-.076
Germany	-.928	.290	-3.20	.001*	.395	-.161
Austria	1.638	.227	7.22	.000*	5.142	.244
Belgium	.709	.236	3.01	.003*	2.033	.114
Denmark	.078	.272	.29	.774	1.081	.010
Slovakia	.641	.238	2.69	.007*	1.898	.097
Hungary	-.781	.337	-2.32	.020*	.458	-.096
Romania	.086	.275	.31	.754	.299	.011
Russia	.566	.231	2.45	.014*	.407	.105
Age	-.017	.003	-6.38	.000*	.983	-.144
Female	-.507	.083	-6.09	.000*	.602	-.126
Education	-.158	.023	-6.93	.000*	.854	-.167
Unemployed	.148	.144	1.03	.303	1.160	.020
Constant	-1.482	.279	-5.31	.000*		
LR chi2(13)	471.71		HL chi2(8)	10.55		
Prob > chi2	0.000		Prob > chi2	.2286		
McFadden's Adj. R ²	.088		-2LL	4576.730		
N = 11046						

* Significant at the .05-level

The number of observations in this model has decreased somewhat, N being 165 observations less than for Model 1. The overall power of the model has not increased very much with the addition of the control variables, but it is significantly better²³. The -2LL has decreased from -4848.5518 to -4576.730 and the McFaddens Adj. R² has increased to .088. The Hosmer-Lemeshow test is still insignificant; however the inclusion of the control variables has moved the value closer to a significant result. As remembered from section 3.2.3, standardized coefficients are only meaningful for the metric variables and will be discussed for those exclusively. To compare the effect of the dummy variables, the discrete effects will be discussed for the complete models later on. At this stage, identifying significance for the control variables is the primary goal.

The *Age* variable has a negative coefficient, meaning that an increase of age would decrease the probability of being a PRR-voter. The effect is clearly significant even at the .05-level. The odds-ratio is .983. From the run-through of logistic regression we know that an odds-ratio

²³ See appendix for test

below 1.0 indicates a negative relationship between the independent and the dependent variable. Since we are dealing with odds-ratios the effect is the same independent of where we are on the x-axis. For each year a respondent age the odds for being a PRR-voter decrease with 1.7²⁴ percentage points. The (fully) standardized coefficient is -.144. For each standard deviation increase on the x-axis there is a decrease of -.144 standard deviations on the y-axis. The direction of the coefficient is in line with the assumption that the typical PRR-voter is relatively young (Givens 2005).

The *Female*-variable shares the same basic characteristics as the *Age*-variable. It has a negative coefficient at -.507 and is significant at the .05-level. This is a dummy variable and a negative coefficient indicates that a male respondent (0) is more likely to be a PRR-voter than a female respondent (1). The odds-ratio is .602. A female respondent has 39.8 percentage points lower odds than a man. PRR-parties have always been male-dominated (Givens 2004) and the results confirms the theoretical assumption.

Education has a negative coefficient at -.158, revealing that the higher education the less likely it is for a respondent to vote for a PRR-party. Like the other two control variables *Education* is also significant at the .05-level. The odds-ratio is .854. This means that for each level of education the respondent advance, the odds for being a PRR-voter decrease with 14.6²⁵ percentage points. In other words, the higher education the less likely it is that the respondent votes for a PRR-party. The standardized coefficient is -.167. Another similarity with the other control variables is that also *Education* is in line with the theoretical expectations (Westin 2003).

The *Unemployed*-variable has a positive coefficient of .148, in line with the theoretical expectation that respondents who are unemployed are more likely to vote for PRR-parties. However, the variable is not significant and both the odds ratio and standardized coefficient shows that it has a minimum of impact on the dependent variable. This reflects the theoretical diversity on the subject, where Jackman and Volpert (1996) is one of few studies where a significant effect has been detected, albeit this was at the macro level. The results from model 2 state that unemployment is not a significant variable at the micro level.

²⁴ Percentage change in odds = (exponentiated coefficient – 1.0) x 100
 (983-1) x 100 = 1,7 per cent change in odds

²⁵ (.854-1) x 100 = -14.6

Summarized, the second model has revealed that three control variables have a significant effect and all have proven to influence the probability for being a PRR-voter in the assumed direction. The *Unemployed*- variable was insignificant and will not be included in the following pan-European models. The third model will include the independent variables of interest, a first indication of which issues that mobilize PRR-voters.

4.4 Model 3: The effect on PRR-voting in Pan-Europe – full model

Model 3 will take us a step closer to answering the research question. After having established the significant difference between countries and the relevance of the control variables I will now add the independent variables of interest to see which issues mobilize PRR-voters.

Table 8 Model 3: The effect on party choice in Pan-Europe – full model

Variable	Coef.	Z	P> z	Odds ratio	Std. Coeff.
France	-.553	-1.75	.080	.575	-.085
Germany	-.931	-2.81	.005*	.394	-.156
Austria	1.792	6.95	.000*	6.004	.273
Belgium	.682	2.57	.010*	1.979	.110
Denmark	.061	0.19	.847	1.063	.007
Slovakia	.708	2.54	.011*	2.030	.091
Hungary	-1.069	-2.89	.004*	.343	-.134
Romania	-.0322	-0.10	.921	.968	-.004
Russia	.616	2.29	.022*	1.852	.093
Age	-.018	-5.47	.000*	.983	-.137
Female	-.476	-4.71	.000*	.621	-.112
Education	-.097	-3.49	.000*	.907	-.097
Lack of confidence – EU	.488	4.27	.000*	1.629	.114
Lack of confidence - Parliament	.534	4.43	.000*	1.705	.121
Environment – no financial support	.048	1.53	.127	1.049	.039
Strong leader	.203	1.82	.068	1.225	.043
Cultural resistance – immigration	.303	2.50	.012*	1.354	.068
Employment resistance - immigration	.534	4.81	.000*	1.705	.124
Extremist attitudes	.713	5.28	.000*	2.040	.113
Economic preferences	.018	2.02	.043*	1.018	.050
Constant	-2.594	-6.79	.000*		
LR chi2(20)	537.44	HL chi2(8)	3.89		
Prob > chi2	.000	Prob > chi2	.8670		
McFaddens Adj. R ²	.136	-2LL	3038.047		
N = 7604 ²⁶					

* Significant at the .05-level (two-tailed)

²⁶ The drop in observations is a possible break on the assumption of “missing at random” and is problematic when comparing between models, however the need for maximum number of observations in order to answer the research question has been deemed more important. A visual inspection does not reveal any systematic lack of response

When we look at the general level of the model we see that the -2LL has decreased from 4666.6924 to 3038.047. The model is significantly better²⁷. The McFadden Adj. R² has increased from .088 to .136. The Hosmer-Lemeshow test is also insignificant indicating that the model fits the logistic curve.

Table 9 Checking for country differences pan-European

Wald test	
Chi2 (9)	282.17
Prob > chi2	.000

It is necessary to perform a second Wald test to confirm that there are country differences even after the independent variables have been added to the analysis. Theoretically the differences between countries detected in model 1 could have been explained by the inclusion of the independent variables. However, the Wald-test shows that there is still a significant difference between the countries that is not accounted for by the independent variables, which justifies the inclusion in the third model.

Starting with the three control variables, they are all still significant at the .05-level, and have the same direction, as shown by the original coefficient.

Lack of Confidence - EU has a positive coefficient sign and is significant at the .05-level. The odds-ratio is 1.629. An increase of one, moving from having confidence to having no confidence in the EU, increases the odds with 62.9 percentage points. From this we learn that a lack of confidence in the European Union is a significant political issue for mobilizing PRR-voters.

Lack of Confidence - Parliament share the same characteristics as previous variable. The coefficient is positive, showing the direction of the variable. Since the variable is coded 0 – confidence and 1 – no confidence, it is clear that a lack of confidence towards national parliaments increases the chance of being a PRR-voter. The variable is significant at the .05-level and the odds-ratio is 1.705. A respondent that lacks confidence in the EU has 70.5 percentage points higher odds for being a PRR-voter than a respondent with confidence.

²⁷ See appendix for test results

Moving on to *Environment – no financial support*, the coefficient is positive, meaning that the more inclined a respondent is to be negative against state involvement to protect the environment, the more likely the same respondent is a PRR-voter. However, the variable is not significant, showing that PRR-parties does not mobilize voters on post-materialist values and should thus not be counted as part of a “silent counter-revolution”.

Strong leader has a positive coefficient, the expected direction based on the theoretical assumptions. The variable is not significant at the .05-level, but is not far off with a significance value of .068. The possibility of a one-tailed test was considered, which would have made the variable significant, but I did not consider the theoretical fundament to be strong enough.

If we look at the variables connected to fear of “the others”, all three variables are significant. *Cultural resistance - Immigration* has a positive coefficient, telling us that if respondents feel that immigrants should give up cultural customs they are more likely to vote for a PRR-party. The variable is significant at the .05. The odds-ratio is 1.354, those who dislike immigration on the basis of cultural resistance has odds that are 35.4 percentage points higher than those who do not.

Employment resistance – Immigration also has a positive coefficient, meaning that if a respondent is restrictive in his views on immigration related to the work market, he/she is more likely to be a PRR-voter. The variable is significant at the .05-level and has an odds-ratio of 1.705. Thus, a respondent with a restrictive view has odds that are 70.5 percentage points higher than one who holds the liberal view on immigrants coming to work in their country.

Extremist attitudes is also significant at the .05-level. The coefficient is positive, telling us that extremist views are positive for the probability of being a PRR-voter. The odds-ratio is the highest of all the explanatory variables at 2.040. Those with extremist views has odds that are 104 percentage points higher than someone without extremist views.

The final variable is the *Economic preferences*-variable. It is significant at the .05-level and has a positive effect. Remembering how the variable is coded, a positive coefficient means that right-wing economics is positive for the PRR. The odds-ratio is 1.018, meaning that for

each increase on the x-axis the odds increase with 1.8 percentage points. The standardized coefficient has a value of .050, the weakest effect of the significant metric variables.

Summing up Model 3, all the variables except for, *Strong leader* and *Environment – no financial support*, came out significant at the .05-level. *Strong leader* would be significant at the .10-level, but due to the large number of respondents the cut-off point has been set at a restrictive level. *Environment – no financial support* is clearly insignificant and shows that the “silent counter-revolution” is not a political issue that mobilizes PRR-voters.

So far the results have been reported in logit values and odds ratios. However, by utilizing the *mfx*-command in Stata is possible to calculate the marginal and discrete effects for each of the significant variables. This way we can identify how much effect the variables have on the probability for voting for a PRR-party. The marginal and discrete effects show the increase on the dependent variable when the independent variable increases per unit change, when all other variables are held at their mean. The marginal effects are for metric variables, whereas discrete effects report the change when dummy variables move from 0 to 1. This process has been performed for all the significant variables in the pan-European model.

Since the dummy variables have the same interval between 0 and 1, the discrete effects can be used to compare the strength of the variables. This is not applicable for the metric variables, but here the standardized coefficients can be used to compare the effect between the metric variables exclusively.

Table 10 **Marginal and discrete effects from the pan-European model**

Variable	Effect	Percentage change in probability	Z
Age	-.0007	-0.07 %	-5.48
Female	-.0182	-1.82 %	-4.68
Education	-.0037	-0.37 %	-3.50
Lack of confidence – EU	.0182*	1.82 %	4.35
Lack of confidence – Parliament	.0193*	1.93 %	4.65
Cultural resistance – Immigration	.0111*	1.11 %	2.61
Employment resistance - Immigration	.0197*	1.97 %	4.92
Extremist attitudes	.0351*	3.51 %	4.18
Economic preferences	.0007	0.07 %	2.02


* Discrete effects for dummy variables

The results reflect the odds ratios with *Extremist attitudes* being the strongest dummy variable. If a respondent moves from not having extremist attitudes to having those attitudes, the

probability for being a PRR-voter increases with 3.51 per cent, given that all other variables are held at their mean value. The second and third strongest of the dummies are *Employment resistance – Immigration*, with a percentage change of 1.97 per cent and *Lack of confidence – Parliament*, with a percentage change of 1.93 per cent. If a respondent moves from having confidence, to lacking confidence in the EU the probability for being a PRR-voter increases with 1.82 per cent. The same impact does the *Female*-variable have. The probability for being a PRR-voter is 1.82 per cent higher for a man than for a woman. The weakest of the dummy variables is *Cultural resistance – Immigration*, holding such attitudes only increase the probability with 1.11 per cent.

We also see that the metric variables give small increases in probability. For each year a respondent age, the probability increases with -0.07 per cent. The same effect, but in the opposite direction, is present for *Economic preferences*. However, the standard coefficient is higher for the *Age*-variable, -.137 to .050, indicating that age has a stronger effect than economic preferences. *Education* decreases the probability with -0.37 per cent for each level of education. The standardized coefficient is -.097, positioning it between *Age* and *Economic preferences* in terms of strength. If all the significant variables of interest, and the control variables at an optimal level, are present, the total probability reaches 33.47 per cent.

Figure 2 The effect of Extremist attitudes – controlled for age I



The figure below illustrates the effect of *Extremist attitudes*, the strongest dummy variable, when controlled against *Age*. Every variable not present in the figure is held at the mean value. We see that the likelihood for PRR-voting is at its highest when the respondent is young, and

also that there is a big gap in probability between those with extremist attitudes and those without extremist attitudes.

4.5 Model 4: The effect on PRR-voting in Western Europe

The model for Western Europe includes all variables, also those who were deemed to be insignificant in the pan-European model. The variables may still be significant when only WE is analysed and to be able to compare properly with the results of the pan-European model they must be included. In addition to the large model, a Wald-test to check for country differences is included, as well as checking the probabilities through the *spost-command* in Stata. Denmark is used as the reference category for the country dummies.

Table 11 Model 4: The effect on party choice in Western Europe

Variable	Coef.	Z	P> z	Odds ratio	Std. Coeff.
France	-.658	-2.18	.029*	.518	-.117
Germany	-1.100	-3.40	.001*	.333	-.208
Austria	1.736	7.32	.000*	5.673	.304
Belgium	.566	2.17	.030*	1.762	.103
Age	-.018	-4.32	.000*	.982	-.133
Female	-.480	-3.67	.000*	.619	-.105
Education	-.105	-2.91	.004*	.900	-.101
Unemployment	.063	.24	.812	1.065	.007
Lack of Confidence - EU	.520	3.49	.000*	1.681	.113
Lack of Confidence - Parliament	.702	4.65	.000*	2.018	.152
Strong Leader	.194	1.33	.184	1.214	.037
Cultural resistance – Immigration	.704	3.54	.000*	2.021	.132
Employment resistance - Immigration	.712	4.77	.000*	2.038	.153
Extremist attitudes	1.041	5.59	.000*	2.833	.113
Economic preferences	.016	1.38	.166	1.016	.041
Environment – no financial support	.066	1.65	.099	1.068	.051
Constant	-4.181	-8.65	.000*		
LR chi2(16)	491.79	HL chi2(8)	10.73		
Prob > chi2	.000	Prob > chi2	.2174		
McFaddens Adj. R ²	.201	-2LL	1789.94		
N = 4423					

* Significant at the .05-level (two-tailed)

The -2LL is 1789.94, down from 3038.047 in the pan-European model. The McFaddens Adj. R² is .201. This is an increase of 6.9 points from model 3. The Hosmer-Lemeshow test is insignificant, indicating a good model fit.

Table 12 Checking for country differences – Western Europe

Wald test	
Chi2 (4)	217.05
Prob > chi2	.000

The Wald-test shows that there are still differences between countries, even when we only look at countries from Western Europe. The country dummies must therefore remain in the model.

Age, *Female* and *Education* are all significant at the .05-level and have a negative coefficient, indicating that a young male with little education are the characteristics of a PRR-voter. *Age* has an odds ratio of .982, for each year a respondent ages, the odds for being a PRR-voter is reduced with 1.8 percentage points. The standardized coefficient is -.136. *Female* has an odds ratio of .619, a female has 39.1 percentage points lower odds for being a PRR-voter than a male. *Education* has an odds ratio of .899, for each increase in education level, the odds for being a PRR-voter decrease with 10.1 percentage points. The standardized coefficient is -.101. *Unemployment* was highly insignificant.

Lack of Confidence – EU is significant with a positive coefficient, and has an odds ratio of 1.681. If a respondent lacks confidence in the European Union, the odds for being a PRR-voter are 68.1 percentage points higher than for someone with confidence in the European Union. *Lack of Confidence – Parliament* shares the same traits as the previous variable. The odds ratio is 2.018. If a respondent lacks confidence in the parliament, the odds for being a PRR-voter increase with 101.8 percentage points.

Strong Leader is one out of three variables that is not significant in Western Europe, this is in line with the theoretical expectations. As expected, both variables connected to immigration are highly significant. *Cultural resistance – Immigration* has a positive coefficient and the odds ratio is 2.021. If a respondent wants immigrants to assimilate into the existing national culture, the odds for being a PRR-voter are 102.1 percentage points higher than if the respondent would allow an immigrant to retain his own culture. *Employment resistance – Immigration* also has a positive coefficient, revealing that the effect points in the same direction as the previous variable. The odds ratio is 2.038, giving odds that are 103.8 percentage points higher if the respondent is negative to immigration on the basis of his own

job security. Since both variables are significant, it proves that immigration mobilize PRR-voters in WE.

Extremist attitudes is also significant with a positive coefficient. The odds ratio is 2.833, the highest in the analysis. If a respondent has extremist attitudes the odds increase with 183,3 percentage points. That is the highest increase in odds of the independent variables. The significance of the variable in Western Europe is against the theoretical expectations. This will be discussed more in-length in the next chapter.

The two last variables, *Economic preferences* and *Environment – no financial support*, do not yield significant results. Both have a positive coefficient, the theoretically assumed direction, but fail to have a significant impact on the dependent variable. That *Economic preferences* is insignificant, supports the claim made by Mudde, saying that economic policies are subordinate to other areas for PRR-parties (Mudde 2007:119). *Environment – no financial support* is significant at the .10-level, but the cut-off level for the analysis is at .05-level.

Three out of four control variables, and five out of eight independent variables of interest, are significant. When comparing the standardized coefficients, *Employment resistance – Immigration* is the strongest, followed by *Lack of Confidence – Parliament* and *Extremist attitudes*.

Probabilities of the significant independent variables of interest, give even more information on the impact on the dependent variables. The probabilities are found through the *mfx-command* in Stata. The method has already been described in subsection 4.6.

Table 13 Marginal and discrete effects from the Western European model

Variable	Effect	Percentage change in probability	Z
Age	-.0006	-0.06 %	-4.27
Female	-.0160*	-1.6 %	-3.60
Education	-.0035	-0.35 %	-2.89
Lack of confidence – EU	.0168*	1.68 %	3.53
Lack of confidence – Parliament	.0227*	2.27 %	4.65
Cultural resistance - Immigration	.0200*	2.00 %	4.11
Employment resistance – Immigration	.0226*	2.26 %	4.79
Extremist attitudes	.0538*	5.38 %	3.78

* Discrete effects for dummy variables


When looking at the marginal and discrete effects, *Extremist attitudes* is still the strongest variable. If a respondent obtains extremist attitudes, with all other variables held at the mean value, the probability increases for being a PRR-voter increases with 5.38 per cent. The second strongest dummy variable is *Lack of confidence – Parliament*, a change from confidence to no confidence, increases the probability with 2.27 per cent. It is closely followed by *Employment resistance – Immigration*, which increases the probability with 2.26 per cent. The weakest effect is obtained for *Female*. A male is 1.6 per cent more likely to vote for a PRR-party than a woman.

For each year a respondent age, the probability for being a PRR-voter decreases with 0.06 per cent. For each higher education level, the probability decreases with 0.35 per cent. As with the dummy variables, the percentages apply when all other variables are held constant at their mean value. When comparing the metric variables, *Age* has the strongest effect. Its standardized coefficient is -.133, compared to *Education* and its standardized coefficient of -.101. All percentages apply only when all other variables are held at their mean value.

When all the significant independent variables of interest, and the significant control variables, are present at an optimal level, the probability for being a PRR-voter is 40.52 per cent.

The figure below shows the effect of the strongest variables, again *Extremist attitudes*, when controlled against *Age*. All variables not mentioned in the figure are held at their mean value.

Figure 3 The effect of Extremist attitudes – controlled for age II



4.6 Model 5: The effect on PRR-voting in Central and Eastern Europe

As with the model for WE, the model for Central and Eastern European include all variables, also those who were deemed to be insignificant in the pan-European model. The variables may still be significant when only CEE is analysed and to be able to compare properly with the results of the pan-European model they must be included. In addition to the large model, a wald-test to check for country differences is included. Croatia is used as the reference category for the country dummies.

Table 14 Model 5: The effect on PRR-voting in Central and Eastern Europe

Variable	Coef.	Z	P> z	Odds ratio	Std. Coeff.
Slovakia	.843	2.84	.004*	2.324	.176
Hungary	-.553	-1.42	.155	.575	-.110
Romania	.053	.15	.879	1.054	.010
Russia	.656	2.29	.022*	1.927	.154
Age	-.018	-3.11	.002*	.982	-.144
Female	-.490	-2.90	.004*	.612	-.127
Education	-.039	-.83	.408	.961	-.040
Unemployment	.239	.99	.320	1.270	.037
Lack of Confidence - EU	.403	2.16	.031*	1.497	.103
Lack of Confidence - Parliament	.160	.77	.441	1.173	.037
Strong Leader	.167	.92	.355	1.182	.041
Cultural resistance – Immigration	.055	.32	.746	1.057	.014
Employment resistance - Immigration	.095	.54	.592	1.099	.024
Extremist attitudes	.454	2.24	.025*	1.574	.097
Economic preferences	.014	.97	.334	1.014	.043
Environment – no financial support	-.010	-.19	.850	.990	-.008
Constant	-2.875	-4.75	.000*	.056	
LR chi2(26)	64.29	HL chi2(8)	11.80		
Prob > chi2	.000	Prob > chi2	.161		
McFaddens Adj. R	.002	-2LL	-605.44		
N = 2976					

* Significant at the .05-level (two-tailed)

Even though very few of the independent variables of interest are significant, the -2LL is down to 1210.88 from 3038.047 in the pan-European model. Considering the drop in -2LL, the McFaddens Adj. R² is surprisingly low, at just .002.

Table 15 Checking for country differences – Central and Eastern Europe

Wald test	
Chi2 (4)	25.30
Prob > chi2	.000

The Wald-test is significant also for the country dummies in Central and Eastern Europe. The results therefore justify the inclusion of the country dummies in the analysis to explain contextual differences, not accounted for by the independent variables.

Age and *Female* are significant at the .05-level with a negative coefficient, as expected. *Age* has an odds ratio of .982, for each year a respondent age, the odds of being a PRR-voter increase with 1.8 percentage points. The standardized coefficient is -.144. *Female* has an odds ratio of .612. A female respondent has 38.8 percentage points lower odds than a male respondent for being a PRR-voter. *Unemployment* and *Education* fails to yield a significant result.

Lack of Confidence – EU is one of two independent variables of interest that is significant, and as expected it has a positive coefficient. The odds ratio is 1.497, giving some who lacks confidence odds that are 49.7 percentage points higher than someone with confidence in the EU. *Lack of Confidence – Parliament* has a positive coefficient, the theoretically expected direction, but the variable is not significant.

The same goes for *Strong Leader*, *Cultural resistance – Immigration* and *Employment resistance – Immigration*. The coefficients show that the direction of the variables is as expected, but the results are not significant, showing that variables do not have a significant impact on the dependent variable. As expected the two variables connected to immigration was insignificant, but it is more surprising that *Strong Leader* shared the same fate. It can be taken as evidence for a consolidating democratic perception in CEE.

Extremist attitudes provides the second significant result. That the variable is significant was expected, due to the tendencies discussed in chapter two. The coefficient is positive and the odds ratio is 1.574, the highest in the CEE-model. A respondent with extremist attitudes has odds for being a PRR-voter that are 57.4 percentage points higher than some without extremist attitudes.

The two remaining variables in the model, *Economic preferences* and *Environment – no financial support* are not significant. The second variable also has a negative coefficient, saying that people who are positive to financial support of the environment are more likely to vote for PRR-parties.

Summarized from the model, two control variables, *Age* and *Female*, are significant. Of the independent variables of interest, only two came out significant, *Lack of Confidence – EU* and *Extremist attitudes*.

Table 16 **Marginal and discrete effects from the Central and Eastern European model**


Variable	Effect	Percentage change in probability	Z
Age	-.0008	-0.08 %	-3.17
Female	-.0216*	-2.16 %	-2.92
Lack of confidence – EU	.0174*	1.74 %	2.21
Extremist attitudes	.0225*	2.25 %	2.00

* Discrete effects for dummy variables

As was revealed in the regression model for Central and Eastern Europe, the number of significant variables is reduced from the previous models. *Extremist attitudes* is yet again the strongest dummy variable. Someone with extremist attitudes has 2.25 per cent higher probability of being a PRR-voter than someone without extremist attitudes. More surprising is it to see that *Age* has a higher discrete effect than *Lack of confidence – EU*. A male respondent is 2.16 per cent more likely to be a PRR-voter than a woman. If a respondent lacks confidence in the EU, he or she is 1.74 per cent more likely to be a PRR-voter. *Age* is the only metric variable that was significant. For each year a respondent ages, the probability for being a PRR-voter decreases with 0.08 per cent. All percentage figures apply only when all other variables are held at their mean value. When all the significant independent variables are present, as well as all the significant control variables with optimal values, the overall probability for the model in CEE is 13.72 per cent.

The figure confirms the importance of *Extremist attitudes*, but the gap between those who have extremist attitudes and those without extremist attitudes is smaller than in the pan-European and Western European models. Again, the probability decreases notably with age.

Figure 4 The effect Extremist attitudes - controlled for age III



4.7 Model 6: The effect on PRR-voting in pan-Europe – Including interaction terms

Even though the models from Western and Central and Eastern Europe reported differences in the significant variables, the number of respondents in the two models is different. The WE-model has 1447 respondents more than the CEE-model. In order to make sure that the differences are statistically significant and not a result of the different samples, I have conducted a new pan-European model with interaction terms to be able to measure differences between the two regions. The model will have multicollinearity between the original variables and the interaction terms, making meaningful interpretation of the coefficients, like in previous models, impossible. Thus, the individual coefficients, but whether or not the independent variables and their respective interaction term are collectively significant. This is conducted through a Wald-test and the direction is interpreted by looking at the coefficient sign of the interaction term. Since the Western Europe is coded 1 in the region dummy, a positive coefficient means that the effect of the variable in question is more positive in WE and likewise for CEE with a negative coefficient. The fact that the coefficients for WE and CEE are significantly different from each other, do not prevent them for being significantly different from zero in both regions.

Table 17 Model 6: The effect on PRR-voting in pan-Europe – Including interaction terms

Variable	Coef.	Z	P> z	Odds ratio	Stand. Coeff.
France	-2.342	-3.87	.000*	.096	-.357
Germany	-2.800	-4.51	.000*	.061	-.463
Austria	.060	.10	.918	1.061	.009
Belgium	-1.153	-2.02	.043*	.315	-.182
Denmark	-1.686	-2.79	.005*	.185	-.203
Slovakia	.817	2.77	.006*	2.265	.105
Hungary	-.605	-1.57	.117	.546	-.073
Romania	.028	.08	.936	1.028	.003
Russia	.655	2.28	.022*	1.925	.098
Age	-.018	-5.29	.000*	.982	-.136
Female	-.488	-4.72	.000*	.614	-.113
Education	-.082	-2.85	.004*	.922	-.080
Unemployment	.155	.87	.382	1.17	.019
Lack of confidence – EU	.397	2.13	.033*	1.487	.091
Lack of confidence – Parliament	.160	.77	.440	1.173	.036
Environment – no financial support	-.015	-.28	.782	.985	-.012
Strong Leader	.156	.87	.386	1.168	.033
Cultural resistance – Immigration	.048	.29	.775	1.050	.011
Employment resistance – Immigration	.086	.49	.627	1.090	.020
Extremist attitudes	.441	2.18	.029*	1.554	.068
Economic preferences	.015	1.07	.285	1.015	.042
Lack of confidence – EU*WE	.124	.52	.601	1.132	.027
Lack of confidence – Parliament*WE	.542	2.12	.034*	1.719	.119
Environment – no financial support*WE	.083	1.24	.214	1.087	.098
Strong Leader*WE	.050	.22	.830	1.051	.008
Cultural resistance – Immigration*WE	.667	2.55	.011*	1.948	.154
Employment resistance – Immigration*WE	.635	2.76	.006*	1.888	.141
Extremist attitudes*WE	.609	2.22	.026*	1.838	.055
Economic preferences*WE	.001	.05	.963	1.001	.004
Constant	-2.624	-5.14	.000*		
LR chi2(29)	562.46	HL chi2(8)	6.08		
Prob > chi2	.000	Prob > chi2	.6386		
MacFaddens Adj. R ²	.1578	-2LL	3002.2672		
N = 7399					

Table 18 Significant differences between WE and CEE

Wald-tests		
Variable	Chi2 (2)	Prob > chi2
Lack of confidence - EU	16.78	.000
Lack of confidence – Parliament	22.30	.000
Environment – no financial support	3.06	.217
Strong Leader	2.73	.255
Cultural resistance – Immigration	13.06	.002
Employment resistance – Immigration	23.66	.000
Extremist attitudes	36.71	.000
Economic preferences	3.00	.224

The table shows the Wald-tests conducted on the independent variables of interest. As we can see, there are significant differences between five of the independent variables of interest. Beginning with the variables without a significant difference, *Strong Leader* and *Environment*

– *no financial support* were not significant in neither WE nor CEE. The Wald-tests do not show any difference, as one would expect. *Economic preferences* was significant in the pan-European model, but not in any of the regional models. The Wald-test does not show any significant difference for this variable either. For the three variables that were significant in WE, but not in CEE, *Lack of confidence – Parliament*, *Cultural resistance – Immigration* and *Employment resistance – Immigration*, all have significant differences between the regions. When looking at table 17, the coefficients for the respective interaction terms all have a positive coefficient, meaning that the effect is more positive in WE than in CEE.

The two variables that were significant in both regional models, *Lack of confidence – EU* and *Extremist attitudes*, also report a significant difference between WE and CEE. Both interaction terms have positive coefficients, showing that the effect is more positive in WE than in CEE.

Overall, the use of interaction terms shows that all coefficients, except for three insignificant variables, have significant differences between WE and CEE. This shows that the differences identified in models 4 and 5 are significant and not the result of the selection of respondents.

4.8 Checking the assumptions of logistic regression

There are three main assumptions of logistic regression. First the models must fit the non-linear s-shaped curve, second the error terms must be uncorrelated and third the error term and the independent variables must be uncorrelated (Skog 2004:380-385).

The first assumption is checked through the Hosmer-Lemeshow test which measure the overall fit of the model. If the H-L test is significant there are significant differences between actual and predicted values, indicating that the model is not S-shaped (Hair et al. 2005:372; Skog 2004:383-385). Thus insignificant values are desirable. The H-L value and significance level is reported in all four models and are insignificant for all four models. The model therefore satisfies this assumption of logistic regression.

The second assumption was that the error terms have to be uncorrelated with each other. This is a problem more vital in times series or panel data. In cross-sectional studies based on random selection such as my data set, this is not a problem. However, there may be

correlation within countries, and even parties. This has not been checked for in this thesis and is a subject in subchapter 5.3.3.

The final assumption is that the error term is uncorrelated with the independent variables. This means that there cannot be underlying variables that both affects the dependent variable and is correlated with the error term. This is substantially perhaps the most important, but still the most difficult assumption to test for (Skog 2004). The Hausman-test demands a good set of instrumental variables, and has not been performed. The most accessible way of testing it is through multiple logistic regression analysis as used in this thesis.

VIF-values indicate no multicollinearity between the independent variables. Rabe-Hesketh and Everitt (2007) refers to a critical value of 10 to indicate that there is a problem with collinearity. None of my variables have a VIF-value close to this, all values are reported in the appendix. I have also checked for influential observations using Dfbeta values²⁸.

4.9 Summary of the analyses

The chapter started off with a descriptive analysis of all variables. Furthermore the descriptive data did not reveal very surprising results. The first set of models contained observations from all of Europe. The first model and subsequent Wald and LR-test showed that there was a significant difference between countries that needed to be controlled for in the later models.

The second model including the control variables confirmed that a male gender, young age and low education are significant characteristics of the PRR-voter. When I added the independent variables of interest in the pan-European model, all of them were significant at the .05-level except for *Environment – no financial support* and *Strong Leader*. This showed that most of the traditional issues concerning the PRR-parties, except the “silent counter-revolution” mobilize voters for PRR-parties. The discrete effects showed that *Extremist attitudes* was the strongest dummy variable, while the standardized coefficients showed that *Age* was the strongest metric variable.

In Western Europe, as seen in the table below, five out the six variables from the pan-European model were significant. Yet again, *Extremist attitude* proved to be the strongest

²⁸ The Dfbeta values were collected by using SPSS

dummy variable and *Age* was the strongest metric variable. The same personal characteristics were significant in the Western European model and there were significant differences between the countries included in the analysis.

The analysis for Central and Eastern Europe contained only two significant independent variables of interest, *Lack of Confidence – EU* and *Extremist attitudes*, which the latter had the strongest effect of the dummy variables. In addition only *Age* and *Female* of the control variables were significant. However, as for the other models, the Wald-test revealed significant differences between countries.

The differences from the pan-European model to the CEE-model show how a pan-European approach can cloud regional differences within Europe.

By making use of interaction terms I also showed that the differences between the coefficients from WE and CEE were significant.

Table 19 **Significant issues – a summary**

Variable	Pan-European	WE	CEE
Lack of confidence – EU	X	X	X
Lack of confidence - Parliament	X	X	
Strong leader			
Cultural resistance – Immigration	X	X	
Employment resistance – Immigration	X	X	
Extremist attitudes	X	X	X
Economic preferences	X		
Environment – no financial support			
Age	X	X	X
Female	X	X	X
Education	X	X	
Unemployment			

5 Discussion

The final chapter will discuss the results and answer the hypotheses presented in chapter two., as well as answering the general research question. I will start by comparing the results from the three main models, pan-European, Western European and Eastern European, before moving on to connect the results with the hypotheses. Before concluding I will discuss how my results have implications for future research

5.1 Comparing models

I have tested three²⁹ separate models with all the variables included. A pan-European model, with and without interaction terms, and two regional models for WE and CEE, respectively. When comparing the models reveal large regional differences, but also a few similarities in terms of voter characteristics and to political issues in common.

All models had an insignificant Hosmer-Lemeshow test, indicating the all the models had a good model fit. Two other similarities concern the differences between countries and the characteristics of PRR-voters. Although, not part of the main research question, it has been important to control for these factors to give an accurate as possible analysis. In all analyses, there has been a significant difference between countries, justifying the inclusion of country dummies.

Second, two personal characteristics of the PRR-voters proved to be the same across Europe, those of *Age* and *Female*. In the pan-European and the Western European model, the level of education was also significant, but it failed to yield a significant result in Central and Eastern Europe. Neither in WE nor in CEE was *Unemployment* significant, confirming that employment status is not a significant characteristic. While Golder (2003) proved that unemployment does not matter at an macro level, this is also true at the micro level.

However, most similarities end here. Neither the MacFaddens Adj. R² nor the -2LL value contributes much to a comparison as the sample of observations has been different in all analysis. Instead, we must look at the number of significant findings and the overall probability of the models. The WE-model has five significant variables of interest, whereas

²⁹ Excluding Model 6: The effect on PRR-voting in pan-Europe – with interaction terms, as this model was used to test difference between regions and cannot be compared to the models 3, 4 and 5.

the CEE-model only has two. A comparison between the regional models and the pan-European model also shows how an issue that looks to be significant for all of Europe, not necessarily is so, when investigated more closely. Model 6 also confirmed the results from the regional model, and added more strength by, through Wald-tests, showing that there were significant differences between Western Europe and Central and Eastern Europe.

Including all the significant independent variables, including the control variables and holding all other variables at their mean level, the probability for being a PRR-voter in the pan-European model is 33.47 per cent. When the two regions are compared with the pan-European analysis we see a clear difference. The probability in WE for being a PRR-voter, with the presence of the significant variables is 40.52 per cent. The probability in CEE, with similar settings, is only 13.72 percent. That is a difference of 26.8 per cent. The model is thus better suited to explain PRR-voting in Western Europe.

Turning to the significance of the independent variables of interest, the pan-European analysis give the impression that a number of variables are significant in Europe. However, the regional analyses show that the picture is more complicated. When studying the independent variables of interest exclusively, the pan-European analysis has six significant variables, *Lack of Confidence – EU*, *Lack of Confidence – Parliament*, *Cultural resistance – Immigration*, *Employment resistance – Immigration*, *Extremist attitudes* and *Economic preferences*. Turning the attention to the WE-model, five variables are significant. The same as the ones mentioned above, with the exception of *Economic preferences*. The CEE-analysis only give two variables that are significant for mobilizing PRR-voters in the region, *Lack of Confidence – EU* and *Extremist attitudes*.

In Europe as a whole, the analysis will identify four variables, *Lack of Confidence – Parliament*, *Cultural resistance – Immigration*, *Employment resistance – Immigration* and *Economic preferences*, which are not significant in CEE. The latter variable is the only variable that is significant in Europe as a whole, but not in one of the two regional analyses. The first three are significant in both Europe as a whole and WE, but not in CEE.

Without getting into details about the strength of the individual variables, it seems clear that a pan-European analysis gives a biased perception of which issues that mobilize PRR-voters across Europe. A quantitative analysis of PRR-parties, following the selection made by

Mudde, would wrongly assume that resistance against immigration mobilize voters in CEE-countries. However, the regional analyses clearly show that resistance against immigration is significant only in WE, as expected from the theoretical assumptions. We see how the definitional dispute, referred to in chapter 2, is illustrated through the results found in this thesis. The pan-European analysis provides results that would make CEE parties suitable to be called anti-immigrant parties, whereas this is clearly not the case if PRR-parties were investigated separately for WE and CEE.

That a model, based on the traditional political issues, that theoretically have been identified as important for PRR-parties, produces such diverging results, must be taken as evidence for the differences between Western Europe and Central and Eastern Europe. However, the thesis also recognizes that similarities exist, first and foremost are two variables significant in both regions, *Lack of Confidence – EU* and *Extremist attitudes*, as well as two control variables. Still, a pan-European analysis would yield results that cannot be taken for granted in Europe as a whole.

5.2 Answering the hypotheses

In order to fully understand the results, they must be interpreted in light of the hypotheses presented in chapter two. The previous subchapter pointed at a few similarities and a number of differences. Through answering the hypotheses I can give a more detailed discussion of the results and be able to conclude with regards to the overall research question.

H1a: *PRR-parties in Western Europe mobilize voters who want stricter immigration regulations based on a cultural aspect*

I based this assumption on the fact that immigration has yet to become a very politicized topic in Central and Eastern Europe (Merkel 2003:17; Minkenberg 2002:446; Mudde 2007:71). At the same time, the issue of immigration has always been seen as an area of competence (Betz 2002:206) for PRR-parties in Western Europe. A survey of the literature revealed a development of “cultural nativism, which increasingly concerns itself with the future of European identity and particularly if the Western value system” (Betz 2003:84). The cultural resistance against immigration must also be seen in the light of the political discourses in Europe. Where the political arena is much more extreme in CEE, pure biological racism has led to poor performances in polls in WE (Givens 2005:201-215). So, aside from ideological

considerations, cultural racism seems to be a more strategic choice also from an electoral perspective.

Cultural resistance – Immigration was significant in the pan-European analysis. However, as mentioned in the previous subchapter, a substantial difference was discovered in the regional analyses. In Western Europe the variable was still significant with higher values than in the pan-European analysis. In Central and Eastern Europe the variable was insignificant, and it also had the lowest odds ratio of all the independent variables of interest.

The statistical differences between Western and Central and Eastern Europe should be interpreted as a strengthening of both previous findings, and also of Mudde, who recognizes that immigration is not a heavily politicized issue in Central and Eastern Europe (Mudde 2007:69). When looking at the descriptive statistics for this variable, it should be noted that the presence of cultural resistance against immigrants is 23 per cent higher in Western Europe than in Central and Eastern Europe. This proves two things, both that immigration is a more present theme in Western Europe, but also that PRR-parties have been able to the presence of an attitude into a salient political issue. As such, Betz's claim that immigration is the "main area of competence" (Betz 2002:206) still seems to be the case in Western Europe.

The results confirm the hypothesis. PRR-parties in Western Europe mobilize voters who want stricter immigration regulations based on a cultural aspect, whereas it does not have an effect in Central and Eastern Europe.

H1b: *PRR-parties in Western Europe mobilize voters who want stricter immigration regulations based on job insecurity*

This hypothesis stems from a perceived connection between immigration and an increased chance of higher unemployment. As noted by Hainsworth (2008:76) and Norris (2005:175) the number of immigrants may not be the crucial element, rather the perception that immigrants are harmful to you in any way, that mobilize voters to PRR-parties. Jean Marie Le Pen took advantage of this in his election rhetoric when he proclaimed that "two million immigrants are the cause of two million French people out of work" (Golder 2003:438). Earlier research has found that the combination of immigration and unemployment is

significant at the aggregate level, and my hypothesis is able to shed light on whether this is also true at the individual level (Golder 2003).

Much like the previous variable, *Employment resistance – Immigration* was significant in the pan-European analysis; the similarities do not stop there. In Western Europe the variable is still significant, but the result is reversed in Central and Eastern Europe.

Again we see how a political issue, that of immigration, divides PRR-parties in Europe. The inclusion of employment adds another element, which moves resistance against immigration away from purely being based on various forms of racism. A rather simple explanation can be made for why the variable turns out to be significant in Western Europe, whereas it does not have any effect in Central and Eastern Europe. For a respondent to fear that they might lose their job due to immigration, two elements are necessary. First of all, a certain number of immigration must be present. Even though Hainsworth (2008) and Norris (2005) argue that the sheer number of immigrants may not be crucial, a certain level of immigration must be present, to invoke a sense of “fear” in the population. Second, it is plausible to think that a booming economy creates more employment than a weaker economy. Thus, migrant workers will be attracted by the strongest economies, where it is more likely that they will find work. It should therefore come as no surprise that workers have moved from Central and Eastern Europe to the stronger economies in Western Europe, rather than the other way around.

With most of the migration going from CEE to WE, the significance of *Employment resistance – Immigration* in WE is as expected. Since immigration is not heavily politicized in CEE, and considering the fact that they mostly have been countries of emigration instead of immigration, it is not very surprising that the issue is not significant in the region. The descriptive analysis reveals almost identical levels of resistance of immigrants based on job security between WE and CEE. The difference in significance level is another confirmation that Western PRR-parties have been able to politicize it to a much greater degree than in CEE. The hypothesis is therefore confirmed.

This is the second variable on immigration that is significant in WE and not in CEE. From the discussion it can be concluded that immigration is not a significant political issue for PRR-parties in Central and Eastern Europe, but to a large degree is so in Western Europe.

H1c: *PRR-parties in Central and Eastern Europe mobilize voters who express extreme attitudes*

The background for this hypothesis is the observation that the image of the outgroup is different in Central and Eastern Europe (Mudde 2007). Instead of immigrants, attention is paid to indigenous groups, such as gypsies, Roma and the religious group of the Jews. It seems like the level of tolerance for racial discourse is much higher in CEE, and several mainstream parties collaborate with PRR-parties. In his study of racist extremism in CEE, Mudde finds that harassment of the Roma and the Jews is far more widespread in CEE, partly as a natural consequence of the larger numbers, but also because it is much less condemned than it would have been in WE (Mudde 2005a; Westin 2003). While anti-Semitic arguments would lead to condemnation in WE, it is more present in CEE. Other groups of perceived deviants, such as homosexuals, are also a political issue more so in CEE than in WE. Gay people are seen “as a threat to the survival of the nation” (Mudde 2007:68).

The variable, *Extremist attitudes*, include feelings against Jews, gypsies, people of a different race and homosexuals. It was significant in the pan-European analysis, but much to my surprise it also proved to be significant in both Western Europe and Central and Eastern Europe.

What is surprising with the result is not that it is significant in CEE, which was expected from the theoretical assumptions, but that it is, not only significant, but also has a stronger effect in WE. From chapter two it was identified that when PRR-parties in WE used explicit racist arguments, it tended to damage their position in the polls (Givens 2005). So why then, is *Extremist attitudes*, one of the strongest political issues for PRR-parties in Western Europe?

A potential explanation for why the variable is stronger in CEE, is the position those parties have within mainstream politics. As elaborated on earlier in the thesis, the political environment in CEE is more radical than WE, allowing for a tougher political discourse. PRR-parties do not stand out as much, when compared to the political mainstream, as they do in WE. For a voter in CE, extremist attitudes might not be a political issue that is exclusive for PRR-parties. That can explain why its level of importance is lesser in CEE than in WE, still it is noted that the variable is significant and give the highest probability in CEE.

In WE the situation is somewhat different when it comes to the positioning of the PRR-parties in the party specter. The situation has traditionally been the complete opposite than in CEE, PRR-parties have had an easily identifiable position within national politics, often being denied mainstream status. The parties therefore do not have to compete with other parties that carry nationalistic tendencies. In most cases a western PRR-party would have monopoly on voters with preferences that are either extremist or borderline extremist. It must also be taken into consideration that in important elections, voters place their vote for the party which is closest to their preferences, and at the same time has a realistic chance of gaining a seat in the parliament (Reif and Schmitt 1980).

Following the thought of second-order elections, it seems plausible that western PRR-parties attract voters from right-wing fringe parties with extremist attitudes. These parties are too controversial to have a realistic chance of being elected, thus a number of their voters choose the party closest to their preferences, in many cases this will be the PRR-parties included in this thesis. This is an effect that is more difficult to achieve in CEE, because more parties can front extremist attitudes with credibility, spreading these voters over several parties.

In short, the higher effect of *Extremist attitudes* in WE can be explained by the status PRR-parties have in WE party systems. They are likely to attract voters through the second-order mechanism, preferably from right-wing fringe parties, giving their total electorate a more radical set of opinions than first presumed. In CEE, this effect is not present, due to the radicalized political mainstream presenting several alternatives for voters with an extreme attitude.

Again, if attention is paid to the descriptive analysis, extremist attitudes is present for 39 per cent of the CEE sample, while the figure is 15 per cent in the WE-sample. With this in mind, two things can be noted. First, that, PRR-parties in Western Europe have been better at mobilizing voters based on these attitudes than in CEE. While this also was the case with the two previous variables, it is more surprising that *Extremist attitudes* mirrors the immigration-variables. Second, since the number of people in the electorates that hold these issues is much lower in WE, the potential for bringing larger electoral returns is bigger in CEE. Thus, PRR-parties from CEE have an unreleased potential on this issue, as it is a significant issue in the region.

Nevertheless, *Extremist attitudes* is significant in both Western Europe and Central and Eastern Europe. This means that the hypothesis must be rejected. PRR-parties in both regions mobilize voters with extreme attitudes. This seems to be a uniting characteristic across Europe as a whole.

H2: *PRR-parties in Central and Eastern Europe mobilize voters who are disillusioned with political elites to a larger degree than in Western Europe*

Moving on to political disillusionment I proposed a hypothesis which claims that PRR-parties in CEE mobilize voters who are disillusioned with political elites to a larger degree than in WE. It is a fact that political trust and satisfaction with politicians is on the decline in Western Europe, and recent data sources also show this is true for Central and Eastern Europe (Eurobarometer 2007; Pharr and Putnam 2000). As I wrote in the theory chapter, I found it difficult to direct the hypothesis in a geographical direction. Historically, the protest and populist elements have been emphasized in Western Europe, but studies have shown that the resentment is actually bigger in Central and Eastern Europe.

Lack of Confidence – Parliament was significant in the pan-European analysis. The regional models revealed a difference in significance, with a significant result in Western Europe and an insignificant result in Central and Eastern Europe. Yet again, a variable that seems to be significant for the whole of Europe has a significant difference between Western Europe and Central and Eastern Europe. Mudde identifies populism, defined as the conflict between the “pure people” and “the corrupt elite”, as a part of the maximum definition, it is damaging to a pan-European perspective, that the results do not confirm this for all of Europe (Mudde 2007).

A potential reason for why *Lack of Confidence – Parliament* was insignificant in CEE can be found in an argument related to the explanation for the previous variable. While trust in politicians is on the decline in Western Europe, it is mainly PRR-parties that picture themselves to be representatives of a “distinct alternative outside the political class, clean-hands alternatives, which want to give the power back to the people”, in the words of Jens Rydgren (Rydgren 2005a). While Central and Eastern European party systems by some is deemed to be consolidated (Lewis 2000, 2001, 2007b), others identifies some teething troubles in the form of higher voter volatility and party unstableness (Bakke 2002; Millard 2004). The less stable party system frequently experience new parties, cadre parties,

organized around a few representatives in parliament, without any ties to civil society to mention (Jungerstam-Mulders 2006; Olson 1998). An EU-survey reveals that the new member states on average have 1.1 more parties than the old EU-15, leading to a more fragmented party system (Jungerstam-Mulders 2006:5). New parties will normally try to distance themselves from established parties. The most natural way to do so is for new parties to claim they represent something new and better than the existing party elites. Mudde also notes that populism is incorporated into mainstream politics to a much larger degree in CEE than in WE (Mudde 2007). Therefore, PRR-parties in CEE compete against other parties to a larger degree than the case is in WE.

The results show that it is PRR-parties in WE, who mobilize voters on this issue due to political disillusionment, not parties in CEE. The hypothesis is rejected, but did manage to identify another difference between PRR-parties in WE and CEE.

H3: *PRR-parties in Western Europe mobilize voters that are negative to the EU*

One of the most deep going political changes in Europe has been the expansion of the European Union. The deepening of integration is a controversial project, not only for PRR-parties. They base their resistance upon two main arguments. First, by definition they support the nation, and a supra-state project as the EU is on a collision course with this view from the beginning. Second, the political distance to Brussels does not harmonize with PRR-parties' promise of bringing politics back to the people. The relatively short involvement in Central and Eastern Europe with the EU led the hypothesis to be geographically directed towards Western Europe.

Lack of Confidence – EU is the second variable that is significant in all three models, and as such the results reveal that PRR-parties in both Western Europe and Central and Eastern Europe mobilize voters who lack confidence in the European Union. As mentioned in the paragraph above, the two major themes of nationalism and political disillusionment, serve to make this a profitable issue for the PRR-parties across Europe. The supranational elements of the EU are in clear opposition to the nationalistic elements of PRR-parties. Since the EU, by many, is perceived to be an elite project, with a relatively high degree of consensus within the political mainstream (Hix and Følledal 2005), this may very well be an issue the PRR can profit on in years to come. The descriptive analysis shows that lack of confidence in the

European Union is identical in Western and Central and Eastern Europe. Considering that it is also significant in both regions, it proves that the European Union is a political issue that has been politicized across Europe.

A reason for this variable to be significant in both regions, and especially in CEE, may again be the positioning of the mainstream parties. Hooghe et al. identifies national party attitude to the EU as an inverted U-curve, where the wing-parties are against, whereas almost all mainstream parties support the European Union. (Hooghe et al. 2002). A study of the “anti-EU” vote in national elections identifies PRR-parties among the leading parties of this bloc (Mair 2000). Opposed to some of the previous issues, it seems, based on the findings by Hooghe et al and Mair, that resistance of the European Union is a more exclusive issue for PRR-parties than a general lack of confidence in national parliaments and mainstream politics.

While the variable is significant in both regions, the hypothesis must be rejected as it was directed against Western Europe. The analysis proves that PRR-parties in both Western Europe and Central and Eastern Europe mobilize voters that are negative to the European Union.

H4: *PRR-parties in Western Europe mobilise voters who feels that political financial involvement in environmental issues is unnecessary*

PRR-parties originated around the time when the Greens first appeared on the political stage in Western Europe. The argument behind this hypothesis has been that the big value shift that took place in the seventies triggered a counter-revolution to the Greens. Inglehart was aware of the contrasts between “new politics” and traditional values and norms (Inglehart 1977:13). Even as early as 1981, Lipset noted that post-materialist tendencies also generated a reactive support for right-wing social conservatism (Lipset 1981).

Since it was thought to be a reaction to post-materialism and the value shift connected to it, it is a prerequisite that these conditions are present. Therefore it seemed most likely that PRR-parties mobilized voters on this account in Western Europe.

The results, however, did not reveal a very great significance for *Environment – no financial support*. It was one out of two variables that was not significant in the pan-European model. In CEE it was not significant, as expected. In WE it was not significant at the .05-level, but

did marginally achieve to be significant at the .10-level. While clearly being closer to significance in WE than in CEE, it is not significant at the desired cut-off point of this thesis. It also had a very low odds-ratio and standardized coefficient, further indicating a weak effect. The results reveal little evidence for PRR-parties constituting a counter-revolution against post-materialism. As expected there was no effect in CEE and the variable does not have a strong impact in WE either. This in line with earlier research done by Ivarsflaten (2008:12). As such the hypothesis must be rejected. PRR-parties do not mobilize voters due to a “silent counter-revolution”.

H5a: *PRR-parties in Eastern and Central Europe mobilize voters who support strong leadership*

Mudde identifies authoritarianism as one out of three elements in his maximum definition of populist radical right parties. Authoritarianism is defined as being subservient and uncritical towards authoritarian figures (Mudde 2007:22). While PRR-parties in Western Europe may be critical to how democracy works, they are not opponents of the principles of democracy itself. In Central and Eastern Europe the situation is more complex, Minkenberg claims parties are more reverse-oriented in that they are more openly anti-democratic (2002:358). With this in mind, I proposed a hypothesis that this form of authoritarianism mobilizes voters in CEE.

Strong leader was borderline significant in the pan-European analysis, but was just above the cut-off point of .05-level of significance. As expected from the theoretical arguments, the variable was not significant in Western Europe. However, it did not yield significant results in Central and Eastern Europe either. The willingness to support a strong, authoritative leader is not a political issue that mobilize PRR-voters at all.

This result has important implications for future research. First of all, it shows that democratic principles seem to have found solid ground also in CEE PRR-parties. While the result is valid only for this kind of parties, I interpret it as a signal that democracy is consolidating in the region as a whole. Second, it lends support to the point made by Mudde (2007), that while PRR-voters may support a strong authority, they do not follow it blindly. Giving the leader extra-parliamentary capabilities clearly does not sit well with the respondents in this thesis.

Anyhow, the hypothesis is rejected. PRR-parties in Europe do not mobilize voters through support of a strong leader.

H5b: *PRR-parties in Western Europe mobilize voters who support stronger reactions to violations of the law*

The European Value Study did not contain any variables that were deemed suitable to represent this hypothesis. As such, the hypothesis is not answered in this thesis. This is a weakness, but a study of other potential datasets revealed that at least one hypothesis would have been left out anyway. The EVS was also the only dataset it was possible to extract variables on extremism from.

H6: *Economic preferences mobilize voters for PRR parties*

”It’s the economy, stupid”, the famous slogan penned, by James Carville during the first Clinton campaign in 1992, illustrates the importance of economic questions in politics. Big economic changes have taken place in Europe over the last decades, and especially so in Central and Eastern Europe. The hypothesis aims to reveal whether or not economic preferences mobilize voters for PRR-parties. While two of the earlier classics by Betz (1994) and Kitschelt (1995) give economic preferences a prominent place in their description of the PRR, recent research have questioned its importance (Carter 2005; Ivarsflaten 2005; Mudde 2007).

In Western Europe, PRR-parties have been seen as proponents for neo-liberalism and less state interventionism. However, the situation is different in Central and Eastern Europe, where the change from communism to capitalism has led to increasing inequality among citizens (Berglund et al. 2001:30). Several sources claims that there is a red-brown alliance in the region, mixing nationalistic rhetoric with leftist political ideas (Anastasakis 2000; Miller et al. 1998). It is unclear whether economic preferences are something PRR-parties in Europe have in common, especially considering the unequal experiences they have with market economy. Primarily because of this discrepancy, the hypothesis has been formulated without a geographical direction.

Economic preferences is significant in the pan-European model. In Europe as a whole, for each increase on the left-right scale that constitute the variable, the odds for being a PRR-voter increase with 1.8 percentage points. The variable was the weakest among those significant at the .05-level. The coefficient was positive, meaning that rightist economic preferences are preferred by PRR-voters.

In Western Europe alone, the variable was no longer significant, albeit it still had a positive original coefficient. The same happened in the analysis for Central and Eastern Europe. The variable was no longer significant. Once again, the results of the pan-European analysis shade the results we get when regional analyses are conducted. However, in this case there is no difference between the regions. Economic preferences are not a significant issue neither in Western nor Central and Eastern Europe.

The results support Mudde, who boldly states that "it's *not* the economy, stupid!" (Mudde 2007:119). My analysis adds strength to his argument that the economy is secondary both to PRR-parties, as well as their electorates (Mudde 2007:119-120). Also, in the Central and Eastern Europe, the cleavage structure does not mirror those of Western Europe. While being present, the left-right cleavage is not as dominating as in Western Europe, reducing the importance of economic preferences (Bakke 2002:250) My findings support more recent accounts of the relationship between economic preferences and PRR-parties. As such, the hypothesis is rejected. PRR-parties do not mobilize voters on the basis of economic preferences.

5.3 Conclusion

The goal of this thesis has been to reveal whether or not PRR-voting can be explained by the same model in Western Europe and Central and Eastern Europe. My interest for this question was spurred by Cas Mudde's book "Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe" (2007), where he includes parties from all of Europe in his analysis. By utilizing logistic regression I set forth to reveal which political issues mobilize voters for these parties, and more importantly, if there is a convergence between Western Europe and Central and Eastern Europe. While Mudde used party manifestos as his primary source, I find it equally important to see in practice why voters vote for a PRR-party. Some of the results were as expected, while others proved to be more surprising. The objective for this conclusion is threefold. First, I will summarize the most important findings and answer the general research question, then explain

how my thesis has contributed to the overall research on PRR-parties, before ending with some suggestions for future research.

5.3.1 Political issues mobilizing PRR-voters

Some basic similarities were discovered early on. First of all, there is variation among the countries included in the analysis, which had to be accounted for through the inclusion of country dummies. Furthermore, two voter characteristics were significant in all analyses. As expected, a young male is the most likely PRR-voter, in the pan-European and Western European analysis, *Education* was also a significant characteristic. In the pan-European analysis, six variables were significant. *Lack of Confidence – EU*, *Lack of Confidence – Parliament*, *Cultural resistance – Immigration*, *Employment resistance – Immigration*, *Extremist attitudes* and *Economic preferences*. In Central and Eastern Europe, only two variables were significant, *Lack of Confidence – EU* and *Extremist attitudes*. While these two issues are shared by both regions, it is clear that the pan-European model is affected by the Western European results, not giving an accurate report of which issues that mobilize PRR-voters in Central and Eastern Europe and to a degree also Western Europe. The thesis confirms that immigration is not a big political issue in Central and Eastern Europe. This has implications for those scholars who see mobilization on immigration as the uniting feature of PRR-parties in Western Europe. Continuing such logic, it is unlikely that they will find PRR-parties in Central and Eastern Europe, further widening the definitional conflict within the literature. *Lack of confidence – Parliament* was also not significant in Central and Eastern Europe. With populism, defined as the conflict between the “pure people” and the “corrupt elite”, being a central element in Mudde’s definition, it is drawback for his approach that the variable is not significant in all of Europe. It is also worth noting that authoritarianism, in the form of anti-democracy is unable to mobilize voters, indicating that PRR-voters support democracy.

The compared strength of some of the variables across regions yielded some surprising results. The case of *Extremist attitudes* was the most surprising case, which proved to have a higher effect for PRR-voting in WE than in CEE. In my opinion that is a result of the, on a general level, more radicalized political arena in Central and Eastern Europe. In that region PRR-parties does not necessarily stand out on these issues as much as the case is in Western Europe. While PRR-parties in Western Europe might be the only party with a realistic opportunity of getting representation representing such views, the number of alternatives is larger in Central

and Eastern Europe, due to a more radical political climate. Alternatively, it is of course also possible that the issue is not salient enough to determine party choice in CEE.

The same argument can be used when looking at the diverging results of *Lack of Confidence – Parliament*. In Western Europe it was a significant issue for PRR-voters, whereas in Central and Eastern Europe it did not prove to be significant. Mudde points that populism too a larger degree is a part of the political mainstream in Central and Eastern Europe (Mudde 2007). The higher volatility within the party system also creates a number of new parties that present themselves as new alternatives. Therefore PRR-parties do not get the status as the “only new alternative”, which they too a certain degree have profited from in Western Europe.

It is also worth noting that both policy-issues and protest-issues are significant in the analyses. While the two *Lack of*- variables is more closely connected to protests against the ruling elites, other variables are more easily connected to policies. However, this is most visible in Western Europe where the immigration variables can be translated into policies on immigration. *Extreme attitudes* can also theoretically be translated into policies, but it would be harder to see how these would be acceptable to the general public.

When considering the general research question, I argue that PRR-voting cannot be explained by the same model in Central and Eastern Europe and Western Europe. Even though two issues, *Extremist attitudes* and *Lack of Confidence – EU* were significant in both regions, the differences in the overall models are too large to be neglected. When comparing the number of significant variables, the Western European model has three significant variables that were not significant in Central and Eastern Europe. Among those three are variables connected to the immigration question, thought to be the major area of competence for PRR-parties in Western Europe. Furthermore, the overall probability of the regional models reveals a difference of 26.8 per cent in favour of Western Europe.

5.3.2 Contributions of this thesis

By conducting three full analyses, one each for WE and CEE, and a full pan-European analysis, I have been able to highlight differences and similarities in PRR-voting in Europe. Despite some similarities, the differences between the models show that a complete pan-European analysis is problematic. Despite the fact that the regions shared two variables, *Extremist attitudes* and *Lack of Confidence – EU*, the overall differences are too big to be

neglected. This is backed up by looking at the number of significant variables in the models, but also at the predicted probability for each of the models with an optimal combination of values on the significant variables. This indicates that while it seems to be similar parties when studying party manifestos, they attract voters on different issues. It is therefore of my opinion that pan-European analyses should be conducted with great carefulness, if at all, in the future. The most glaring example of how a pan-European analysis can distort the actual situation is how immigration seems to be an attractive issue, while it is still not politicized to a very high level, when looking exclusively at Central and Eastern Europe.

The thesis has also shown the need for spending more time on demand-side studies, especially for Central and Eastern Europe. The thesis clearly shows that the “perfect breeding ground” has not been identified, when trying to explain how PRR-parties in the region mobilize voters.

5.3.3 Suggestions for future research

Mudde states that most of the research done on PRR-parties from Central and Eastern Europe are individual chapters and very little research of comparative nature. It is my opinion that we need more comparative research that focuses solely on Central and Eastern Europe, to obtain a better understanding of these parties, before conducting more pan-European analyses. I argue that the results obtained in this thesis, show that political issues connected to the Western PRR-parties do not explain very much in a Central and Eastern European context. Future studies should also be able to discuss more clearly whether or not we are dealing with a single party group, or if Western and Central and Eastern Europe represent two divisions of a larger party group?

In my thesis I have treated PRR-parties as part of either a Western or a Central and Eastern block. As the Wald-tests revealed, there are country differences within the two blocks. With better data it is possible to look closer at each individual party and pinpoint mobilizing issues even more accurately. As more quantitative data is gathered from Central and Eastern Europe, this will be easier to carry out. The European Value Study releases new data gathered in 2008 in the fall of 2009, with data from 45 countries. This could serve as a fruitful dataset for further research.

In addition to conducting new analysis on new and improved data, methodological advances can also provide new insight to PRR-parties in Europe. The fact that significant differences

between countries were detected implies that a multi-level structure might be suitable. In addition to differences between countries differences between parties are also a highly likely situation.

Multilevel analysis is able to include the context into the analysis and also study parties over time. Because, much of what is studied in the social sciences is of a multilevel character, multilevel-analyses should be used to a greater extent (Luke 2004; Raudenbush and Bryk 2002). With regards to research on PRR-parties, a three-levelled structure of voters, parties and countries would be able to explain variation in the dependent variable at each level. This makes it possible to include both supply and demand-side variables in the same analysis.

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Appendix

Table 20 Questions in Economy-index

No.	Left	Right
Q54a	The state should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for	Individuals should take more responsibility for providing for themselves
Q54c	Competition is harmful, it brings out the worst in people	Competition is good. It stimulates people to work hard and develop new ideas
Q54d	The state should control firms more effectively	The state should give more freedom to firms

Table 21 Levels of trust in national institutions

Eurobarometer 69 – 2008					
Trust in government		Trust in parliament		(Not) Trust parties	
WE	CEE	WE	CEE	WE	CEE
43,2 %	25,8 %	49 %	20,6 %	66,5 % ³⁰	83,6 % ³¹
Eurobarometer 68 – 2007					
WE	CEE	WE	CEE	WE	CEE
44,2 %	27, 3 %	47, 4 %	21, 9 %	24,5 %	10,7 %
Candidate Countries EB - 2001					
WE	CEE	WE	CEE	WE	CEE
39, 8 %	34, 9 %	41, 5 %	27,5 %	18, 5 %	11,1 %

Table 22 Frequencies of observations

	CEE	WE	Total
PRR	280	411	691
Non-PRR	4939	5812	10751
Total in analysis	5219	6223	11442
Missing	1761	1885	3646
Total in dataset	6980	8108	15088

³⁰ Percentage indicates those who do *not* trust parties

³¹ Percentage indicates those who do *not* trust parties

Table 23 Frequencies of observations by country

Country	Frequency	Percent
France	1615	10.70
Germany	2036	13.49
Austria	1522	10.09
Belgium	1912	12.67
Denmark	1023	6.78
Slovakia	1331	8.82
Hungary	1000	6.63
Romania	1146	7.60
Croatia	1003	6.65
Russia	2500	16.57
Total	15088	100.00

Table 24 Environment – no financial support - Index

Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy.		.500
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity	Approx. Chi-Square	8461,758
	df	1
	Sig.	.000
Factor Loadings		Component 1
environment: give part of income against environmental pollution (Q3A)		.915
environment: increase taxes to prevent environmental pollution (Q3B)		.915
Cronbach's Alpha		N of Items
.805		2

Table 25 Economic preferences - Index

Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy.		.598
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity	Approx. Chi-Square	2678.796
	df.	3
	Sig.	.000
Factor Loadings		Component 1
individual-state responsibility for providing (Q54A)		.721
state give more freedom to-control firms more effectively (Q54D)		.762
competition good-harmful for people (Q54C)		.651
Cronbach's Alpha		N of Items
.516		3

Table 26 Extremist attitudes - Index

Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy.		.721
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity	Approx. Chi-Square	9901.455
	df.	6
	Sig.	.000
Factor Loadings		Component 1
dont like as neighbours: jews (Q7M)		.788
dont like as neighbours: gypsies (Q7N)		.669
dont like as neighbours: people of different race (Q7B)		.757
dont like as neighbours: homosexuals (Q7L)		.673
Cronbach's Alpha		N of Items
		.622 4

Table 27 Vif and Tolerance-values for the variables

Variable	VIF			Tolerance		
	PE	WE	CEE	PE	WE	CEE
France	2.72	2.35		.367	.426	
Germany	3.12	2.60		.321	.385	
Austria	2.82	2.39		.354	.419	
Belgium	2.77	2.47		.361	.406	
Denmark**	2.06			.485		
Slovenia	2.15		1.99	.464		.501
Hungary	2.10		2.03	.476		.493
Romania	1.91		1.91	.525		.525
Russia	2.62		2.29	.382		.437
Croatia*						
Age	1.14	1.13	1.12	.881	.885	.892
Female	1.02	1.02	1.02	.982	.978	.976
Education	1.29	1.29	1.21	.778	.777	.826
Unemployed	1.05	1.05	1.06	.950	.951	.945
Lack of confidence – EU	1.20	1.21	1.19	.834	.827	.837
Lack of confidence – Parliament	1.20	1.19	1.17	.833	.843	.853
Strong leader	1.15	1.08	1.24	.869	.928	.805
Cultural resistance – Immigration	1.16	1.04	1.11	.861	.923	.903
Employment resistance – Immigration	1.16	1.08	1.19	.864	.860	.839
Extremist attitudes	1.20	1.03	1.19	.831	.936	.837
Economic preferences	1.14	1.05	1.16	.874	.899	.856
Environment – no financial support	1.20	1.22	1.13	.833	.819	.885
Party	1.08	1.13	1.02	.922	.882	.979

* Used as a references category and not included in any analyses

** Used as a reference category in the WE-model

Table 28 Dfbeta values – Robustness testing

Variable	PE		WE		CEE	
	Min	Max	Min	Max	Min	Max
Constant	-.12619	.13758	-.06655	.08064	-.12770	.15860
France	-.02418	.03551	-.04631	.04958		
Germany	-.03288	.03408	-.04980	.06426		
Austria	-.02884	.04759	-.04888	.01525		
Belgium	-.02737	.02551	-.05208	.02615		
Denmark	-.01991	.03962				
Slovakia	-.02484	.02401			-.07370	.03510
Hungary	-.02974	.02765			-.07332	.08959
Romania	-.02838	.02451			-.08228	.07033
Russia	-.02711	.02430			-.06796	.03570
Age	-.00087	.00122	-.00052	.00072	-.00075	.00117
Female	-.01835	.02160	-.00954	.01443	-.01424	.02270
Education	-.00786	.00998	-.00446	.00674	-.00895	.01042
Unemployment	-.11890	.16084	-.05208	.06014	-.01745	.04896
Lack of confidence – EU	-.03097	.02143	-.01872	.01517	-.03004	.02452
Lack of confidence – Parliament	-.03458	.02318	-.01993	.01253	-.04091	.02199
Strong leader	-.02546	.04159	-.01225	.01744	-.02367	.02810
Cultural resistance – Immigration	-.06207	.03874	-.03477	.02191	-.02144	.01968
Employment resistance – Immigration	-.02479	.02720	-.01995	.01514	-.02973	.02515
Extremist attitudes	-.04644	.07083	-.02088	.03116	-.02551	.03550
Environment – no financial support	-.01052	.00975	-.00698	.00548	-.00916	.01110
Economic preferences	-.00338	.00303	-.00194	.00159	-.00242	.00267

Table 29 Testing significant improvement of models 1, 2 and 3

Omnibus test of models Coefficients				
From model 1 to model 2	Step	Chi-square	df	Sig,
	Block	72.840	4	.000
	Model	371.493	13	.000
From model 2 to model 3	Step	Chi-square	df	Sig,
	Block	155.190	8	.000
	Model	526.683	21	.000